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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 970229-CA 
vs. : 
LISA DEHERRERA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINSS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1992 as 
amended)whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may 
take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for 
anything other than a first degree or capital felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding the 
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act constitutional pursuant to 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and pursuant 
to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. A trial court's 
determination of a legal question is reviewed for "correctness." 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
2. Whether the good faith exception pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment as recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984) is applicable when evidence was obtained subsequent to a 
warrantless seizure based on a suspicionless roadblock stop of 
defendant, and when the trial court found that law enforcement did 
not comply with the requirements of the Administrative Traffic 
Checkpoint Act in conducting the suspicionless roadblock? A trial 
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court's determination of a legal question is reviewed for 
"correctness." Deli, 861 P.2d at 433. 
3. Whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
is in harmony with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution? The 
trial court's determination of a legal question is reviewed for 
"correctness." Deli, 861 P.2d at 433. 
4. Whether there was a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
defendant posed a threat to officer safety in order to justify a 
search of Defendant's person? Factual findings underlying a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah 
App. 1996) . "Clear error will be found only when the trial court's 
factual findings run against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. 
(citations omitted). Although the facts are considered in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling, legal conclusions based 
on those facts are reviewed "for correctness according no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions." State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 
138 (Utah App.1996). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 14 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE! 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony, in violation of § 58-37-8(2)(I), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended (Count I), unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of § 58-37a-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
(Count II), driving on a revoked drivers license, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of § 53-3-227, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended (Count III), operating a vehicle without insurance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 4l-12a-302, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended (Count IV), and driving with expired 
registration, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of § 41-la-1307, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended (Count V). (R. 5-6). 
At the arraignment on June 21, 1996, defendant plead not 
guilty to all charges. (R. 38-39) . Subsequently, defendant moved 
to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search was 
unreasonable under both Federal and State constitutions, which the 
trial court denied. (R. 110, 154). On July 8, 1996, defendant 
entered a no contest conditional plea to count I pursuant to State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 111-128). Defendant was 
sentenced on November 8, 1997, and was committed to the Utah State 
Prison, (R. 172-173) . 
A notice of appeal was filed on December 3, 1996. (R. 197-
198). On December 13, 1996, judgment, sentence, and commitment was 
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vacated, Defendant withdrew her notice of appeal, and Defendant was 
remanded to the Division of Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic 
evaluation. (R. 207-208) . On March 14, 1997, Defendant was again 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. (R. 218-219) . On March 28, 
1997, Defendant again filed a notice of appeal which has brought 
this matter before this Court. (R. 232). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the trial court, counsel for the State and Defence, finding 
no disputed facts relative to the issues arising from the 
roadblock, stipulated to the facts as contained in memoranda 
submitted by Defendant and by the State. (R. 239, at 241; R. 64-82; 
R. 91-102) . Defendant will recite the facts relative to the 
roadblock as stated in her memorandum. 
On or about September 16, 1996 Defendant was stopped by Deputy 
Adams of the Utah County Sheriff's Office at a roadblock in 
American Fork Canyon. (R. 82). Deputy Adams did not have probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the 
stop of Defendant's vehicle. (R. 82). The roadblock was allegedly 
carried out pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-101 -- § 77-23-
105 (1992). (R. 82). 
On or about June 15, 1992, Craig Madsen, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney and officer Craig Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office filed an application and affidavit in support of the 
application to conduct an administrative traffic check-point 
(roadblock) in American Fork Canyon (Tibbie Fork area). 
(Supplemental Record, File #921001173, 1-39) (hereinafter (SR. 
)). On or about June 15, 1992, the original order authorizing 
the roadblock was signed by Judge Lynn W. Davis. (SR. 49-52) . The 
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original order designated the uniformed patrol sergeant as the 
command level deputy in charge of the check point. (SR. 51). The 
authorized time for the roadblock was June 15, 1992 - September 30, 
1992 from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. (SR. 51). The application named a 
vast number of people who could participate in the roadblock. (SR. 
19-20, 50) . 
On or about August 31, 1992, Craig Madsen and Craig Turner 
submitted a request for amendment of the original order authorizing 
the roadblock. (SR. 53-57). This amendment requested authorization 
to conduct a roadblock from September 1, 1992 through November 30, 
1992 from 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. (SR. 53-57). This amendment also 
requested the addition of eight names of persons who worked for the 
Department of Wildlife Resources to the pool of people authorized 
to participate in the roadblocks. (SR. 56). Judge Backlund signed 
the amendment. 
On or about December 2, 1992, Craig Madsen and Craig Turner 
submitted another amendment to the original roadblock 
authorization. (SR. 58-62). This amendment requested authorization 
to conduct a roadblock from December 1, 1992 through February 28, 
1993 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. (SR. 58-62). This amendment 
requested the addition of seven names from the Utah Highway Patrol 
to the list of authorized personnel. (SR. 61). Judge Sumsion 
signed the amendment. 
On or about May 26, 1993, Craig Madsen submitted another 
request to modify the original order authorizing the roadblock. 
(SR. 63-67). This amendment requested authorization to conduct a 
roadblock from June 1, 1993 through August 31, 1993 from 12:30 p.m. 
to 2:30 a.m. (SR. 63-67). This amendment requested the addition of 
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three names of people from the United States Forest Service to the 
list of personnel. (SR. 66). Judge McGuire signed the amendment. 
(SR. 63). 
On or about July 7, 1994, Craig Madsen, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, and Alex Hunt of the Utah County Sheriff's Office 
submitted a request to amend the original roadblock order. (SR. 68-
73) . This amendment requested the addition of five officers from 
the Utah Highway Patrol, one officer from the United States Forest 
Service, and one officer from the United States Park Service to the 
authorized personnel list. Each officer was named in the amendment 
request. (SR. 72). This amendment requested authorization to 
conduct a roadblock from August 31, 1994 through August 31, 1995 
from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. Judge John Backlund signed the 
amendment. (SR. 68). 
On or about May 26, 1995, Craig Madsen and Craig Turner 
submitted a request for amendment of the 1992 order authorizing the 
roadblock in question. (SR. 74-79). This amendment simply 
requested that all certified personnel from Utah County Sheriff's 
Office, Utah Highway Patrol, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 
U.S. Forest Service, and Utah State Parks and Recreation may 
participate. (SR. 78). This amendment requested authorization to 
conduct the roadblock from May 26, 1995 through August 31, 1996 
from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. Judge Lynn W. Davis signed this 
amendment on May 26, 1995. (SR. 74-79). 
The facts relative to the issue arising directly from the 
search of defendant's person are as follows: the vehicle in which 
Defendant arrived at the roadblock was being impounded for improper 
registration. (R. 250). While defendant was waiting for a ride, 
6 
officer Shiverdecker believed defendant appeared agitated and 
upset. (R. 250). There were eight to ten officers in addition to 
officer Shiverdecker on site. (R. 254). Officer Shiverdecker asked 
defendant if she had any weapons, and defendant replied that she 
didn't have a knife. (R. 251). Officer Shiverdecker approached to 
do a Terry search, and noticed a bulge in defendant's right front 
pant's pocket. (R. 251-252). Officer Shiverdecker instructed 
defendant to remove the items from her pocket, and metharhphetamine 
was discovered. (R. 251-253). 
SUMMARY OF ARQVMENT 
First, Suspicionless seizures of people by law enforcement is 
generally prohibited. After balancing the degree of intrusion on 
one's Fourth Amendment rights as a result of a sobriety checkpoint 
against the societal interest in curbing drunk driving, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found sobriety checkpoints to be reasonable in light 
of the Fourth Amendment. However, the roadblock in the present 
case far exceeded the approved parameters of a sobriety checkpoint, 
and is therefore, unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has followed the warrant 
approach in determining reasonableness of a search and seizure 
rather than the balancing analysis adopted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In the present case, defendant was seized at a roadblock 
without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances. The 
warrant approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court constitutes a 
separate and distinct analysis under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution which prohibits suspicionless roadblock seizures. 
Third, the good faith exception pursuant to United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) is inapplicable to the facts of the 
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present case because Leon only applies to the situation where an 
officer relies in good faith on a warrant which he believes is 
supported by probable cause. The good faith exception was expanded 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision in Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340 (1987) . However, the Krull extension of the Leon good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule is also inapplicable to 
the facts of the present case because the trial court specifically 
found that law enforcement did not comply with the Utah statute 
purportedly authorizing roadblocks even though a magistrate had 
rubber-stamped the roadblock plan. 
Fourth, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is 
inconsistent with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. Utah 
has never recognized a good faith exception under Article I, § 14 
in the past, and the State did not provide any basis for the Court 
to do so now. Most all States that have actually addressed the 
issue of whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is 
consistent with State constitutional principles have declined to 
adopt it. A good faith exception promotes magistrate shopping, 
discourages thorough police work, encourages magistrates to be less 
careful when reviewing warrant applications because there are no 
consequences, and the exclusionary rule does deter officers from 
lazy police work because if they do not gather sufficient probable 
cause before they obtain a search warrant, they know any evidence 
obtained will be inadmissible. 
Fifth, while Defendant was waiting for a ride to pick her up 
from the scene of the roadblock, Deputy Shiverdecker conducted a 
search of Defendant's person. Deputy Shiverdecker did not have a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant posed a danger to 
8 




THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT ACT (ATCA) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
At the trial court level, the court relied primarily on 
Michigan State Police v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444 (1990) to find that the 
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act (Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-
23-101 thru 77-23-105 (1953 as amended)), hereinafter ATCA, is 
constitutional. However, the roadblock in the present case is 
distinguishable from the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz because it was 
far more intrusive than the Sitz roadblock. 
A. ATCA Is Unconstitutional Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution 
It is undisputed that a Fourth Amendment "seizure1 occurs when 
a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock. Sitzf 496 U.S. at 450. 
In Sitz
 r the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
seizure that occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a "sobriety-
checkpoint" is reasonable when the level of intrusion on one's 
Fourth Amendment rights is balanced against the following: (1) the 
state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, 
(2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that 
goal, and (3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy 
caused by the checkpoints. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449; See also Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) . The sobriety checkpoint which was at 
issue in Sitz consisted of stopping the vehicle and briefly 
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examining the driver for signs of intoxication. The driver was 
detained further only if the officer detected signs of 
intoxication. SlLZ, 496 U.S. at 447. Six Justices agreed that the 
state has such a strong interest in controlling the drunk driving 
epidemic that the minimal intrusion of the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment protections was reasonable. Id. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, pointed out that 
usually, even a minimally intrusive seizure must be justified by 
some sort of reasonable suspicion. See Id. at 457. When both the 
majority and dissenting opinions are considered, it appears that if 
the checkpoint/roadblock were more intrusive than a quick check to 
determine if there are any obvious signs of impairment (consistent 
with intoxication), the U.S. Supreme Court would not uphold a 
seizure absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
The Utah legislature codified ATCA subsequent to the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling in Sims v. State Tax Com'n, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 
1992) and the Utah Court of Appeals's ruling in State v. Sims, 808 
P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991) aff'd. 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994). ATCA is 
an attempt to codify the procedure to be followed to conduct 
numerous seizures of citizens at roadblocks without pre-existing 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. ATCA allows a magistrate 
to issue written authority to establish and operate a checkpoint 
if: 
2(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a 
written plan signed by the command level officer describing: 
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and 
topographical information; 
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint; 
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped; 
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint including the inspection or 
inquiry to be conducted; 
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(v) the names of the personnel to be employed in operating the 
checkpoint including the name of the officer or officers in 
charge at the scene; 
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and 
other means of informing approaching motorists that they must 
stop and directing them to the place to stop; 
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the 
establishment of the checkpoint; and 
(viii) instructions to be given to the enforcement officers 
operating the checkpoint; 
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination 
that the plan appropriately: 
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed; 
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry; 
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will 
experience; 
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the 
individual enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and 
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement 
officers. 
U.C.A. § 77-23-104(2). Specifically, the paragraph that primarily 
makes ATCA inconsistent with Sitz is § 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv) which 
allows the purpose of the checkpoint to be inspecting for any 
criminal activity as was done in the case at hand. As a result of 
the open-ended purpose of the roadblock, the level of intrusion 
pursuant to ATCA is significantly greater than that authorized in 
Sitz. In the present case, the application in support of the 
request for authorization to conduct the roadblock states the 
following as the purpose of the roadblock: 
(a) To inspect license plates, registration certificates and 
insurance cards. 
(b) To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint 
requirements. 
(c) To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired 
by controlled substances. 
(d) To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and 
other required exterior safety devices. 
(e) To inspect for other apparent criminal activity. 
(SR. 38). Generally, the purpose of the roadblock in the present 
case can be simply summarized as to inspect for any criminal 
activity. Stopping vehicles at a roadblock to inspect for any 
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criminal activity as is allowed by ATCA is completely different 
than a checkpoint specifically designed for the purpose of reducing 
drunk driving. SjJ^z. does not even approach a finding that a 
roadblock to check for any criminal activity is constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, Sitz implies that in light of 
the undisputed fact that a roadblock results in a Fourth Amendment 
seizure without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, there must 
be a societal interest to be accomplished by the roadblock which 
outweighs the citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449. 
In the present case, the record is absolutely void of any 
reliable facts to support any societal interest which could 
possibly outweigh a citizen's right to be free from warrantless and 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, the suspicionless 
stop of Defendant must be considered in the same light as the 
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse. 44 0 U.S. 
648 (1979) (suspicionless stop of vehicle held to be 
unconstitutional). When the purposes of the subject roadblock are 
examined, it is clear that the purpose far exceeds the sobriety 
checkpoint purpose approved in Sitz. 
In the present case, the trial court held that ATCA had been 
violated because the checkpoint was ongoing, the personnel were not 
specifically listed, and the purposes were much too broad. (R. 
107). Significantly, the trial court stated in its memorandum 
decision, "the roadblocks are ideally set up to check for drunk 
drivers. By broadening the search, the officers violated the third 
criterion of the Sitz test and the search conducted at the 
roadblock becomes too intrusive upon an individual's rights." (R. 
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106) . But nowhere in ATCA is the purpose limited to simply 
checking for drunk drivers. The trial court apparently interpreted 
the underlying intent of the statute based on the Sitz case. 
Although SiiLZ is certainly an authority in considering roadblock 
issues, whether or not ATCA is constitutional should not turn on 
going beyond the plain language of ATCA and interpreting it in 
light of SJLLZL. "The best evidence of the true intent and purpose 
of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the 
Act." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995). "Unless the 
statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to 
delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history." A.B. v. 
State of Utah. 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 (Utah App. 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
In the case of ATCA, the plain language is overly broad, but 
not ambiguous. There is no need to look beyond the four corners of 
the statute. The trial courts observation that roadblocks which 
are greater in scope than a sobriety checkpoint consistent with 
Sitz a^ re unconstitutional (R. 106, 107), is certainly an accurate 
observation; however, going beyond the plain language of ATCA and 
finding that its intent was simply to allow roadblocks consistent 
with &UL2, is not consistent with the rules of statutory 
construction. See Hunt/ 906 P.2d at 312, 
ATCA allows law enforcement officers to conduct roadblocks 
which &re more intrusive than the sobriety checkpoints allowed in 
SitZ/ <=md there is no evidence on the record which would support a 
finding that the intrusion on Defendant^ Fourth Amendment rights 
is outweighed by any particular societal interest. Therefore, ATCA 
should be found unconstitutional pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 
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B. ATCA Is Unconstitutional Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution 
Contrary to the balancing approach that the U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted in analyzing the constitutionality of suspicionless 
roadblock stops pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Utah Supreme 
Court held in Sims, 841 P.2d 6 (finding suspicionless roadblock 
stops unconstitutional) that under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, unless there are exigent circumstances, a warrant is 
required to search and seize an automobile: 
Recently, this court interpreted the search and 
seizure provision of the Utah Constitution differently 
than the federal courts have characterized the 
corresponding federal provision. In State v. Larocco, 
294 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), we held that under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, a police officer 
could not open the door of a car parked on a street to 
inspect the vehicle identification number. This result 
contrasted with the United States Supreme Court's holding 
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated under similar 
facts. See New York v. Class. 475 U.S. 106 (1986). 
Similarly, in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-418 
(Utah 1991) , we held that a depositor has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his bank records under the Utah 
Constitution despite the United States Supreme Court's 
contrary ruling with regard to the Fourth Amendment. See 
United States v, Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
Both the Utah and United States Constitutions contain 
a "reasonableness" and a "warrant" requirement. In recent 
years, the United States Supreme Court has vacillated 
between the warrant approach and the reasonableness 
approach in developing federal search and seizure law 
regarding automobiles. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. The 
result reached in Larocco reaffirmed this court's 
commitment to the warrant approach under our state 
constitution. Id. At 470 (""warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent 
circumstances require action before a warrant can be 
obtained.'" (quoting State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 
411 (Utah 1984))). 
Id. at 8. 
Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated that 
Article I, § 14 provides even more protection than the Fourth 
Amendment "for the primary purpose of shielding Utah citizens "from 
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the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts.1" State v. Jackson, 315 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26, 28 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has departed 
from federal search and seizure jurisprudence "[for] the purpose of 
establishing a more workable rule for police and trial courts than 
exists under confusing federal case law." Xd- (internal citations 
omitted). 
In determining the constitutionality of roadblock seizures, 
the U.S. Supreme Court considered a balancing approach to determine 
the reasonableness of the seizure. Sitz. 496 U.S. at 44. However, 
as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Larocco: 
[T]his court will continue to use the concept of expectation 
of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for determining 
whether article I, section 14 is applicable. Then if article 
I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be permitted 
only where they satisfy their traditional justification, 
namely, to protect the safety of police or the public or to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. 
Larocco. 794 P.2d at 469-70. In the present case, it is undisputed 
an expectation of privacy exists and a seizure occurs when one's 
vehicle is stopped at a roadblock. Therefore, Article I, § 14 is 
invoked, and warrantless searches will be permitted only if there 
are exigent circumstances. 
It is undisputed in the present case that a warrant was not 
obtained prior to the seizure of defendant, and it is also 
undisputed that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity prior to the stop and detention of defendant. There is no 
indication in the record of any exigent circumstances such as 
safety of the police, safety of the public or threat of destruction 
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of evidence which would justify the seizure of Defendant at the 
roadblock in question. 
The uncontroverted basis of the stop in question was a 
roadblock purportedly pursuant to ATCA. (R. 110) Because ATCA 
attempts to authorize a stop and seizure of citizens without a 
warrant, reasonable suspicion, or exigent circumstances, it is 
unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Moreover, similar to the reasons why roadblocks were found 
unconstitutional in the Sims cases, ATCA violates the Utah 
Constitution because it allows officers to conduct a roadblock for 
any purpose. Pursuant to Article I, § 14, a roadblock should be 
conducted only when law enforcement has reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause that persons to be stopped at the roadblock are 
involved in criminal activities, or when there are other exigent 
circumstances which justify the stop. In the present case, the 
officers were simply conducting a wholesale search for any criminal 
activity in which persons approaching the roadblock may be 
involved. This type of activity must be a prime example of the 
type of law enforcement activity that Article I, § 14 was designed 
to prohibit against. 
The only significant restriction ATCA imposes on law 
enforcement personnel as a result of the Sims holdings, is that a 
magistrate must affirm the roadblock will minimize the intrusion on 
citizens in light of law enforcement's chosen purpose for the 
roadblock. U.C.A. § 77-23-104(2)(b). In other words, ATCA does not 
require a magistrate to review the purpose of the roadblock, but 
simply the means of carrying out the roadblock in light of the 
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purpose. Therefore, ATCA does not significantly change the 
rational applied in Sims, 841 P.2d 6 and Sims, 808 P.2d 141 where 
suspicionless roadblocks were found to violate Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. This Court should find that the roadblock 
in the present case performed under ATCA was also unconstitutional 
because it was hardly different from the unconstitutional roadblock 
in Sima. 
This Court should note that notwithstanding the U.S*: Supreme 
Court's holding in SJJLZ., 496 U.S. 444, the Michigan appellate court 
subsequently found the suspicionless sobriety checkpoint to be 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Michigan Constitution. Sitz v. 
Department of State Police, 485 N.W.2d 135 (Mich App. 1992) . 
Consistent with the arguments made above together with the analysis 
in Sitz v. Department of State Police, 485 N.w.2d 135, this court 
should find ATCA unconstitutional pursuant to Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
POINT II 
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES 
NOT APPLY TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE 
PURSUANT TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Upon consideration of defendant's motion to suppress in the 
present case, the trial court found that: 
. . .the plan for the administrative checkpoint did not 
comply with the terms of the statute because it was 
overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional. 
The statute describes various specifics with which the 
administrative checkpoint must comply before it is to be 
approved by the judiciary. The time, date, duration, the 
names of the personnel to be employed at the checkpoint, 
and the instructions and purpose of the checkpoint must 
be included. 
Although in the instant case the time, date and 
duration are included in the plan the Court finds that an 
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ongoing checkpoint which may be set up at any time over a 
period of a year is entirely too long and does not meet 
the intent of the statute. 
Also, the names of the personnel are required to be on 
the plan, in this case merely the office from which they 
were to come was placed on the plan. Thus, the 
specificity that the statute requires was not included in 
the plan. 
Lastly, the purpose as well as the instructions which 
the officers have at the roadblock went beyond the scope 
of the statute. The roadblocks are ideally set up to 
check for drunk drivers. By broadening the search the 
officers violate the third criterion of the Sitz test and 
the search conducted at the roadblock becomes too 
intrusive upon an individual's rights. 
(R. 106, 107). 
Notwithstanding the trial courts finding that the plan for the 
subject roadblock which was prepared, submitted, and followed by 
the Utah County Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's 
Office, was overly broad, invalid, unconstitutional, and that 
various specifics of the plan were not complied with, the trial 
court held: ". . .where the plan for the roadblock was submitted to 
and approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to rely 
upon such approval in good faith and therefore the evidence should 
not be suppressed because of the good faith exception." (R. 107). 
Subsequently, in responding to additional argument by defendant, 
the trial court ruled: "The Court finds that there is no 
requirement for the State to prove good faith when the officers 
were acting pursuant to what they believed was a valid warrant 
issued by a magistrate. (R. 154). The trial court's rulings were 
erroneous on a number of issues. 
A. The Leon Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule is 
Inapplicable in the Present Case 
The trial court based its ruling on United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984). (R. 108). When Leon was decided, the United 
States Supreme Court noted the good faith exception does not apply 
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where law enforcement relies on a statute that permits a 
warrantless search on less than probable cause as in the present 
case: 
"We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule 
requires suppression of evidence obtained in searches 
carried out pursuant to statutes, not yet declared 
unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and 
seizures without probable cause or search warrants. gee, 
e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres v. 
Puerto Rico. 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). "Those decisions 
involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized 
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the 
traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 
at 39. The substantive Fourth Amendment principles 
announced in those cases are fully consistent with our 
holding here. 
L&Qn, 468 U.S. 913, n.8. 
Utah Code Annotated provides a definition of the type of 
search warrant which if relied upon in good faith may give rise to 
the possibility of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
under the Fourth Amendment: 
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the 
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, describing 
with particularity the thing, place, or person to be searched 
and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought 
before the magistrate. 
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the 
person or place to be searched and the person, property, or 
evidence to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201; Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203(1). 
Undisputedly, the authorization to conduct the roadblock in 
question, does not purport to be a warrant, and would not qualify 
as a warrant even if it was held out as such. (SR. 52). 
Therefore, the good faith exception does not apply to the 
present case where the officers were not relying on a sworn 
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affidavit ratified by a magistrate finding probable cause as was 
the case in L££n. In the present case, the good faith exception 
does not apply to the circumstances as it is undisputed that the 
seizure of defendant at the roadblock was done without a warrant, 
without probable cause, without reasonable suspicion, and without 
exigent circumstances. The exclusionary rule should apply to 
exclude the evidence seized in violation of the Fourth amendment 
because the L££TL good faith exception is inapplicable. Tfonr 468 
U.S. at 913, n.8. 
B. The Expanded Good Faith Exception Pursuant to Illinois v. 
Krilll is Not Applicable to the Facts of the Present Case 
In Illinois v. Krull. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) the U.S. Supreme 
Court extended the good faith exception to cover circumstances 
where law enforcement personnel relied on statutes later declared 
unconstitutional to justify a warrantless search. In the present 
case, the search in question was performed in reliance on ATCA, 
U.C.A. §§ 77-23-101 thru 77-23-105. The State may argue that law 
enforcement in the present case relied on ATCA, and may avoid the 
exclusionary rule by application of the expanded good faith 
exception. However, when the Krull holding is applied to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the trial court 
in this matter, it is apparent that even the expanded good faith 
exception does not salvage the unlawful conduct of the officers in 
this case from the exclusionary rule. Krull, 480 U.S. 340; (R. 
106, 107). 
As discussed above, the trial court in the present matter did 
not find ATCA to be unconstitutional. Rather, the trial court 
found that the plan prepared and submitted by the Utah County 
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Sheriff's Office and Utah County Attorney's Office went beyond the 
scope of ATCA. The trial court found that the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office did not comply with the requirements of ATCA by: 
(1) failing to appropriately state the time, date, and duration of 
the roadblock,1 (2) failing to appropriately state the names of 
personnel (including command level officers) participating in the 
roadblock, and (3) expanding the purpose of the roadblock beyond 
the purpose of sobriety checkpoints allowed in Sitz. (R. at 106, 
107) . 
Because the trial court did not find ATCA unconstitutional, 
but rather, found error in law enforcement personnels' actions 
relative to the plan which they followed in carrying out the 
roadblock, the extension of the good faith exception from Krull 
does not apply. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50. 
C. Even if the Good Faith Exception is Applicable to the 
Facts of the Present Case, the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office and Utah County Attorney's Office Did Not Act in 
Good Faith 
If this Court finds the good faith exception pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment should be considered in light of the facts in the 
present case, the Utah County Sheriff's Office and the Utah County 
Attorney's Office did not act in good faith, and the trial court 
erred by not considering the lack of "objective reasonableness" in 
the purported reliance by law enforcement on the magistrate's 
approval of the roadblock plan. (R. 152). Moreover, the undisputed 
1
 The trial court's ruling states that a "period of a 
year is entirely too long and does not meet the intent of the 
statute." (R. 106, 107). However, the plan followed by the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office and Utah County Attorney's Office 
included a time frame that was even longer, 15 months. (SR. 75). 
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facts manifest bad faith on the part of law enforcement relative to 
the operation of the roadblock in question. 
The majority opinion in Leon held that in determining whether 
the good faith exception is applicable, law enforcement must act in 
good faith: 
We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we 
adopt is an objective one. Many objections to a good-
faith exception assume that the exception will turn on 
the subjective good faith of individual officers. 
"Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, 
however, retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an 
incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole 
to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth 
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S., at 261, n. 15 
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); See Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S., at 221 (STEVENS, J., concurring). The 
objective standard we adopt, moreover, requires officers 
to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits. 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975). 
Leon. 468 U.S. at 919, n. 20 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 
Leon court stated that "[i]t is necessary to consider the objective 
reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a 
warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who 
provided information material to the probable-cause determination." 
Id. at 923 n.24. Therefore, in addition to the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office, the actions of the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
who assisted in the preparation of the application and amendments 
to conduct roadblocks, must also be considered in the determination 
of whether there was objective good faith on the part of law 
enforcement. 
In Krull, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the objective 
reasonableness requirement: "As we emphasized in Leon, the standard 
of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one; the standard does 
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not turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers 
JKTUll, 480 U.S. at 355 (citing Leon, 468 U.S at 919, n . 2 0 ) . 
Law enforcement officers certainly cannot claim to have acted 
in ob j ect i ve good fait h re 1 i ance on A rCA when: I t: hey £ a i ] t: : comp 1 y 
with the simple, unambiguous checklist format of ATCA. As cited 
above the trial court found that the law enforcement personnel 
failed to comply with ATCA's requirements by r lot statii lg t:l ie date 
of the roadblock, the names of the participants at the roadblock, 
and the general purpose was much too broad exceeding the level of 
intrusion allowed in Sitz. (R 1 0 6 ) . seems impossible to claim 
that law enforcement personnel acted objectively reasonable in 
complying w - " :- -ICA when the trial court found so clearly that the 
plan prepared, submitted, and fo] lowed by law enforcemeiit personnel 
was "overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional." (R. 1 0 7 ) . 
""^ "• ^iinreme Court has considered the effect of officers 
failing to comply with statutory requirements when relying on a 
warrant. In State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd in 
part, 850 P '«! '127 (Utah 1992), officers failed to comply with the 
requirements of a "no-knock" nighttime warrant as required by § 77-
23-205 and § 77-23-210 (as presently titled in the Utah C o d e ) . The 
Utah Court of Appeals held that the magistrate erred in authorizing 
the no-knock nighttime warrant and that: 
"Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous statutory 
directive to present the magistrate with "reasonable 
cause to believe a search is necessary in the night," 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-23-5(1) (1990) [now § 76-23-205], 
and then claim that their very failure to do so is 
objectively reasonable conduct on their part. See Leon. 
468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. At 3419 n. 20 (objective 
standard requires reasonable knowledge of the law by 
police officers); United States v. Freitas, 610 F.Supp. 
1560, 1572 (N.D.Cal. 1985) (police agency must train 
officers, who have obligation to ensure that warrant 
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comports with constitutional law), aff'd. 800 F.2d 1451 
(9th Cir. 1986) . 
Id. at 738. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals only because the Supreme Court found that 
having your house searched at night, rather than in the day when it 
could have been properly searched, does not constitute a 
fundamental right invoking the Fourth Amendment. The Utah Supreme 
Court did not reverse the rational of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
See Rowe. 850 P.2d 427. The logic of the Utah Court of appeals in 
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 is still well taken. In light of the analysis 
in Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, the fact that law enforcement failed to 
provide the magistrate with a plan that complied with ATCA, law 
enforcement cannot avoid the exclusionary rule by claiming good 
faith reliance on the magistrate when the plan is later deemed 
inconsistent with ATCA. 
Additionally, the objective standard of reasonableness 
requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law 
prohibits. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, n. 20. In the present case, Law 
enforcement personnel including the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
either knew or objectively should have known that the plan 
submitted for the roadblock was not consistent with the holding of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sitz, nor with the checklist form of 
ATCA. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sitz predated the 
original roadblock application in the present case by approximately 
two years. &JJL&/ 496 U.S. 444. 
In Sitz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that stopping a motorist 
at a roadblock is a Fourth Amendment seizure; however, in light of 
the drunk driving epidemic, a minimally intrusive plan to check for 
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drunk drivers at the checkpoint was approved. The plai i all :> wed (1 ) 
stopping of all vehicles passing through the checkpoint; (2) brief 
quest:i c: ni ng of each d:i i ver to determine if there are any signs of 
intoxication, and (3) only if there is reasonable suspicion : f 
impairment detected through the brief questioning would a driver be 
directed out (• the flow of traffic and be required to produce 
his/her license, registration, etc. or be required to perform 
further field sobriety tests. Id 496 U.S. at 447-55. 
Whether law enforcement personnel had actual knowledge of the 
Sitz holding, or whether such knowledge is imputed pursuant to the 
objectively reasonable officer requirement of Leon and Krull. the 
resu] t: :i = the same. Nevertheless, the actions of the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office in preparing 
the roadblock plans and subsequent amendments demonstrates an 
intentional disregard for the plain ] anguage of ATCA. The lack of 
objective good faith is exacerbated in this case because the Utah 
County Attorney's Office participated in the preparation of the 
roadblock piaiib, Sb > •> *\ * r^ r\ ? u?, 6 7, 73, 79). Certainly, 
the Utah County Attorney's Office must have known of the opinion of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sitz together with the Utah case law on 
tl le matter, ai id recog i lized that the subject plan did not comply 
with the ATCA checklist, the holding in Sitz, or Utah case law. 
The original application to conduct the roadblock in question 
was submitted arid wai. rubber-stamped by Judge Lynn W. Davis on June 
15, 1992. The original application and authorization allowed 
approximately 97 named members of the Utah County Sheriff's Office 
to participate m th>- roadblork, and allowed the roadblock to be 
conducted everyday from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. for two and Vi 
25 
months. Upon expiration of the original term for the roadblock, a 
series of amendments were submitted to at least three other judges. 
Various changes were made. Officers from other governmental 
agencies were added to the authorization, and the length of time in 
which the roadblocks could be operated grew to three months to 1 
year to 1 year and three months. Finally, the names of command 
level officers and personnel who could participate were completely 
deleted. Any command level officer from the Utah County*Sheriff's 
Office was allowed to supervise the roadblock, and any certified 
personnel from the Utah County Sheriff's Office, Utah Highway 
Patrol, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, Utah Forest Service, 
or Utah State Parks and Recreation was allowed to participate. 
Although Defendant does not believe that the original 
application and authorization to conduct roadblocks at the site in 
question complied with ATCA, it was substantially more compliant 
than the final amended authorization that allowed virtually any 
person with a uniform to participate in a roadblock for any purpose 
supervised by any officer of the Utah County Sheriff's Office which 
may be conducted everyday for a period of one year and three 
months. Moreover, the practice of law enforcement in this case of 
submitting a roadblock plan pursuant to ATCA, and then filing 
amendments over the course of the next three years is not 
consistent with the plain language checklist of ATCA. (SR. 39, 57, 
62, 67, 73, 79) . 
In addition to the failures to comply with ATCA as addressed 
above, the purpose of the roadblock was not aimed at any particular 
societal evil such as the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz. Rather, the 
general purpose of the roadblocks were to inspect for criminal 
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activity. (SR 26 3 . ' -— i:::::- c: ~ 17e-.s *•*---
included use of a drug sniffing dog around the vehicle. (SR. at: 26, 
38, 4 6 ) . 
"T"i lere i s i 10 evI.dei ICe of ofaj ect ive good fa i t:h oi :i, t:he part: of 
law enforcement personnel in operating the roadblock in question, 
and therefore, the trial court's application of a good faith 
except ion t: ::> t:l le exc ] i is ionary rule should be reversed. 
POINT III 
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE I, § 14 OP THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
A. UTAH H. A S NO"! ADOPTED A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION" TO ARTICLE I, 
The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a good faith 
exception pursuant to Article 1, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Rowe. 8 06 P. 2d .' /JiJ n , .tate v. Mendoza 748 P ?d I.1 
(Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Accordingly, the evidence 
obtained when law enforcement officials violated Defendant's 
constitutional r ights i mder Ar tic] e 1 Section 14 should bf1 
suppressed. 
In Larocco, the Supreme Court expressly held that the 
"exclusion : f i] legal 1 } obtained evidei ice :i s a necessary 
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14." 794 
P.2d at 472. The Court chose not to rule on the scope of the 
exclus:i onar y i u 11 e oi 1 iet:hei a doctrine para] 1 e 1 to t:he I ieoi i 
exception applied to the Utah Constitution See Id. at 473 
The "good faith exception" is subject to much criticism. The 
three dissenting just j ces in Leon, Justices Brennan, Stevens, ai id 
Marshall, articulated many reasons why a good faith exception is 
27 
inconsistent with American jurisprudence. The dissenting justices 
in Leon criticized the rational of the majority that there is no 
deterrent effect to the exclusionary rule when police officers act 
with objective good faith, and assert that the exclusionary rule 
stands for much more than simply to deter a single police officer 
from infringing on a citizen's rights: 
Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the 
judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single 
governmental action prohibited by the terms of the *. 
[Fourth] Amendment. Once that connection between the 
evidence-gathering role of the police and the evidence-
admitting function of the courts is acknowledged, the 
plausibility of the Court's interpretation becomes more 
suspect. . . .It is difficult to give any meaning at all 
to the limitations imposed by the Amendment if they are 
read to proscribe only certain conduct by the police but 
to allow other agents of the same government to take 
advantage of evidence secured by the police in violation 
of its requirements. The [Fourth] Amendment therefore 
must be read to condemn not only the initial invasion of 
privacy--which is done, after all, for the purpose of 
securing evidence--but also the subsequent use of any 
evidence so obtained. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., and Marshall J. dissenting) 
(internal footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan goes on to write 
that the exclusionary rule as it existed before Leon "is more 
faithful to the meaning and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and to 
the judiciary's role as the guardian of the peoples constitutional 
liberties. . . .[T]he evidence-gathering role of the police is 
directly linked to the evidence admitting function of the courts, 
[and] an individual's Fourth Amendment rights may be undermined as 
completely by one as by the other." Id. at 938. 
It seems apparent that if evidence is consistently excluded 
when police officers violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, §14 rights, whether the violation is intentional or not, 
police departments will be prompted to instruct their officers to 
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devote greater care and attention to fulfill i i ig their jobs ii 1 
harmony with constitutional principles. Id. at 955. However, 
adopti on of a good faith exception pursuant to Article I, § 14 will 
promote police ignorance and magistxale whopping tic t m d t lie judge 
who will stretch the limits of the constitution. Id. at n.14. 
Add i t ional] y, police incentive to work just a little harder to 
corroborate tips and gain more evidence before intruding on one's 
rights will be lessened if a good faith exception is adopted, and 
magistrates who wi ] ] 3ign bare bone warrants or applications to 
conduct roadblocks will be sought out. Id. 
Moreover, one year prior to the L£2H ruling, the U.S. Supreme 
Cc)in: t adopted a "total i ty c: f the circumstances" test for probable 
cause determinations in the ruling in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983) . 
[I]t is virtually inconceivable that a reviewing court, 
when faced with a defendant's motion to suppress, could 
first find that a warrant was invalid under the new Gates 
standard, but then, at the same time, find that a police 
officer's reliance on such an invalid warrant was 
nevertheless "objectively reasonable" under the test 
announced today. Because the two standards overlap so 
completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found 
invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it 
could be seen as objectively reasonable; otherwise, we 
would have to entertain the mind-boggling concept of 
objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively 
unreasonable warrant. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 958-59. Justice Stevens in his dissenting 
opinion makes a similar comment: "The Court's conclusion that such 
searches undertaken i :i tl lout probable cause can nevertheless be 
"reasonable" is totally without support in our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Id. at 967 (Stevens J., dissenting) Justice 
Stevens further stated: "an off d cer ' s good L:i i t-.h cannot make 
otherwise unreasonable1 conduct reasonable (citations omitted). 
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The majority's failure to appreciate the significance of that 
recognition is inexplicable." Id. at 969, n.19. In order to avoid 
the confusing quagmire of the totality of the circumstances test 
overlapping with the objective reasonable good faith standard, Utah 
should continue to adhere to the clear-cut exclusionary rule 
requiring suppression of evidence acquired as a result of a search 
in violation of Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Most states that have actually addressed the issue of whether 
a good faith exception is consistent with its respective State 
constitutional principles which protect its citizens from 
unreasonable searches and seizures have agreed with the rational in 
the dissenting opinions in Leon, and have found that a good faith 
exception to the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures is inconsistent with its respective State constitution. 
1. CONNECTICUT 
Connecticutfs rejection of Leon in State v. Marsala. 579 A. 2d 
58 (Conn. 1990), could easily be read as a text for other states 
wishing to weigh the good-faith rule against their own 
constitution. Justice Shea, writing for a unanimous court, found 
that the good-faith exception was incompatible with the state 
constitution, although the Connecticut constitutional provision 
against unreasonable searches and seizures is virtually identical 
to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 62. In short, the Connecticut 
court refused to "sanction a practice in which the validity of 
search warrants might be determined under a standard of "close 
enough is good enough' instead of under the "probable cause1 
standard mandated by article first, § 7, of our state 
constitution." Id. at 70. 
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Justice Shea foilowed the est:ab 1 ished d:i r ec11 v es and based t:i ie 
decision on independent state grounds that went "beyond those 
[protections] provided by the federal constitution, as that 
document has been inter pre ted 1: y the IJn i ted States Supreme Court " 
Id. at 63. 
Not only did the Connecticut court reject Leon, it challenged 
the Supreme Court's entire analysis of the costs and bene:-' of 
excluding evidence obtained in good-faith. Justice Shea*wrote that 
«-v •=> ^nr,ts would actually exceed any potential benefits from 
admitting evidence because: 1) police officers wou.H spend more 
time "judge shopping" than trying to establish necessary probable 
cause; 2) ji idges would be less careful in reviewing warrant 
applications as there would be no consequences i f t:l ley made a 
mistake; and 3) the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter 
f u t u r e p o .1 i c e m i s c ondu ct and, mo re importantly, protect judicial 
integrity to ensure compliance with the issuing requirements : * ie 
state constitution. Id, at 67-68. 
2 . ~ ~~~ : w ; h *] 
The Delaware Supreme Court has not completely rejected Leon 
bi i t :ii t: • :i :i I express it' s reluctance to make "an unprecedented break 
with more than two hundred years of history" by adopting the good-
faith exception in Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242 (Del. 1987). 
Although the court rejected the application of Leon in this case, 
the decision only effected wneLn-: n ^ood-faith exception waul. I be 
recognized for violation of the statutory requirements necessary to 
make a valid nighttime search of a residence. Id. at 254. 
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Although not a far-reaching decision, the Delaware Court did 
take an important step in finding that Delaware statutes and the 
state constitution must be met before Leon could be accepted. Id. 
3. GEORGIA 
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Leon in a unanimous 
decision in 1992. Gary v. State. 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992). The 
Georgia court based its rejection of Leon on independent state 
grounds, but took the distinctive approach of focusing m6stly on 
statutory law and only briefly acknowledging the probable cause 
requirements found in the Georgia constitution. Id. at 428-29. 
4. HAWAII 
The Hawaii Supreme Court criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's 
opinion in l&on, and declined to adopt a good faith exception in 
State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889 (Hawai•i 1995) (spelling of "Hawai•i" 
consistent with original). "Although we acknowledge that the 
Hawai'i exclusionary rule serves the valuable purpose of deterring 
governmental officials from circumventing the protections afforded 
by the Hawai'i Constitution (citations omitted), we now pronounce 
that an equally valuable purpose of the exclusionary rule under 
article I, § 7, is to protect the privacy rights of our citizens." 
Id. at 902 (emphasis in original). 
5. IDAHO 
In 1989 the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Leon in State v. 
Prestwich, 783 P.2d 298 (Idaho 1989), but later reversed and 
rejected the good-faith exception on state constitutional grounds 
in a 3-1 decision. State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992) . 
After a historical review of both federal and state exclusionary 
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rules., the Idaho Supreme Coux t rejected L^^H because 1 r was 
"incompatible with the multiple purposes behind [the] independent 
state exclusionary rule." Id. at ^"1 The court distanced itself 
from the United States bup;c^ finding that deterrence was 
only part of the justification for the exclusionary rule. Justice 
P. i^rline wrote that the reasons for Idaho's exclusionary rule were 
three-fold: to deter police misconduct; t n pievenl. -m additional 
and independent constitutional violation by the court by* admitting 
tainted evidence; and to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system. Id. 
i. MASSACHUSETTS 
Less than one year after Leoi i, Massachu ••*::s . .g:-:-* -; ^ urt 
summarily rejected the decision in a footnote in Commonwealth v. 
IZBtflB 476' N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985). The Massachusetts court found 
that state statutes "require that warranto b»- issueu! oril> il there 





"^ .de* I z^ d pursuant to a warrant not based on probable cause." 
Id. at 554. Because of these state requiren lei its, til: le court wrote 
that they were precluded from even considering the hoon good-faith 
except iori I > I at 5 54 f n. 5 . 
' MISSISSIPPI 
The Mississippi Supreme Court essentially declined to adopt 
the rational ot the U.S. Supreme Court i n Leon, and stated: 
"Enforcement of the [exclusionary] rule places the parties in the 
position they would have been in had there been no violation of 
the defendant's constitutiona i ..j;-r > - ;: -ear^r^s :ar\d 
seizures] made pursuant to warrants issued without probable cause." 
SLllns^J^JL^2X^L^f 491 So.2d 837, 850 (Miss. 1986). 
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8- NEW HAMPSHIRE 
New Hampshire, like many states, applied the Leon good faith 
exception pursuant to the Fourth Amendment until the good faith 
exception was challenged based on independent state grounds; when 
that challenge occurred, New Hampshire declined to follow Leon: 
"The exclusionary rule serves to redress the injury to the privacy 
of search victim and guard compliance with the probable cause 
requirement of part I, article 19." State v. Canelo, 653*A.2d 1097, 
1105 (N.H. 1995). 
9. NEW JERSEY 
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Leon decision after 
finding the state constitution afforded greater protections than 
the federal constitution in State v. Novembrino. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 
1987). Although the New Jersey constitution is virtually identical 
to the federal constitution in its search and seizure standards, 
the New Jersey court found that any application of Leon would 
"undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed standard of probable 
cause, and. . .disrupt the highly effective procedures employed by 
our criminal justice system. . . . " Id. at 857. 
The majority opinion heavily criticized the United States 
Supreme Court for limiting the reasons for the exclusionary rule to 
deterrence. Justice Stein wrote that deterrence was not the only 
function of the exclusionary rule, it "also serve[d] as the 
indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to 
be free from unreasonable searches." Id. at 856. 
34 
NEW MEXICO 
Tl le New Mexico Supreme Court used a unique line of analysis in 
rejecting the good-faith exception in State v. Gutierrez. 863 P 2d 
1052 (N.M. 1393) The New Mexico court disagreed with the U S. 
Supreme Coin I '" i fi ndi „g that the exclusionary rule is a - idicially 
created remedy." See Leon 468 U S. at 906. Instead, zne iNew 
Mexico court found that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
u - r-e-*es«% » effectuate . . . the constitutional right of the 
accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure." 
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067. This line of analysis allowed the New 
Mex;- ' -:scount and avoi d the entire deterrence debate. 
For this court, a good-faith exception was simply incompatible with 
the state constitution. Gutierrez 863 P.2d at 1068. 
)RK 
New York's highest court hastily dismissed the good-faith 
except.:; -
 rar~>-aphs in People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 
(N.Y. 1985) . The court found that accepting Leon would "completely 
frustrate" the purpose of the exclusionary rule, reward illegal 
police behavi or and f- "uragp * - officers '• * engage in illegal 
acts. Id. at 458. 
12. NORTH CAROLINA 
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Leon pursuant to its 
state constitution and state statutory law in State v. Carter, 370 
S " ±?bo) . The North Carolina court justified leaving 
the exclusionary rule unmodified as the state legislatore had 
adopted the exclusionary rule to protect against unreasonable 
sear^r —;./.>-*- ^ 7 , long before the United States Supreme 
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Court required the states to do so in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). £&r£££, 370 S.E.2d at 556. 
The North Carolina court stated that the exclusionary rule was 
necessary to protect judicial integrity and "the only effective 
bulwark against governmental disregard for constitutionally 
protected privacy rights." Carter. 370 S.E.2d at 559. The court 
also found that "decency, security, and liberty" required rejection 
of the good-faith exception or crime, contempt for the Law, and 
anarchy would possibly result. Id. 
13. PENNSYLVANIA 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. 
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1990), is another model decision for 
states to follow. The Pennsylvania court vigorously denied that 
the exclusionary rule was used only to deter errant police and 
based their exclusionary rule on the state constitutional right of 
privacy and the probable cause standards necessary to justify a 
warrant under the state constitution and state statutory laws. Id. 
at 899. 
Justice Cappy, writing for the majority, conducted a lengthy 
historical overview of the federal and state exclusionary rules, 
concluding the probable cause standard "is designed to protect from 
unwarranted and even vindictive incursions upon our privacy[,]. . 
.insulates from dictatorial and tyrannical rule by the state, and 
preserves the concept of democracy that assures the freedom of its 
citizens." Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899. Because of the important 
position held by the probable cause standard, the majority agreed 
that the good-faith exception would "virtually emasculate those 
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clear safeguards which have been carefully developed under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 years." Id, at 899. 
I 1 VERMONT • • 
The Vermont Supreme Court rejected the good-faith exception as 
i» violated the probable cause standards set forth in the state 
constitution and the st-ate rules ot criminal proceduie in State v. 
Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991) The Vermont court strongly 
disagreed *r*"h the cost/benefit analysis employed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Leon calling it an attempt "1 J ' *: ~ 
this time cannot be done. There simply are insufficient empirical 
data fi ::>r the costs and benefits of a good faith exception to be 
accurately assessed " Id. at 12 6. 
The Vermont court saw various costs that the Supreme Court did 
not consider, i nc] uding an increase in magistrate shopping, 
increased mistakes from inadequate police presentations and less 
responsibility for issuing magistrates. Id. at 125-26. 
\ si gnificant m n: iiber of states have followed the U.S. Supreme 
Court's lead in Leon and adopted the good faith exception. 
However, most states which have followed Leon have not yet 
subjected th<° Issue tn independent State constitutional analysis. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that it would not 
adopt such a position of blind adherence to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
See &1LI12, "ii i1 .M > 'W"[T]his court interpreted the search and 
seizure provision of the Utah Constitution differently than tlle 
federal courts have characterized the corresponding federal 
provisi or i") . 
At the trial court, Defendant briefed the issue that pursuant 
to Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution there has never been a 
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good faith exception recognized, and the State did not present any 
justification for the Court to adopt such an exception now. 
Defendant asserts that the rational of the dissenting Justices in 
LfiCn, and the analysis of the various States who have declined to 
follow hson, is more consistent with the broader protection of 
citizens provided by Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution than 
the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. See Sims. 841 
P.2d 6; Larocco, 294 P.2d 460; and Thompson. 810 P.2d 415. This 
Court should not create a "good faith exception" under the Utah 
Constitution, and should continue to follow Utah Constitutional 
precedent which requires suppression of evidence seized illegally 
as a result of warrantless searches and seizures or warrants which 
are not supported by probable cause. 
B. If the Court Finds That the Leon Good Faith Exception is 
Consistent With Article I, § 14, the Court Should Find 
That the Extension of the Good Faith Exception in Krull 
is Not Consistent With Article 1/ §14 
Although Defendant asserts that no good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule is consistent with Article I, § 14, if the 
Court should adopt the Leon good faith exception, the Court should 
not adopt the extension of the good faith extension in Krull, 480 
U.S. 240. 
Justice O'Connor who was part of the majority opinion in Leon, 
was joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice 
Stevens in dissenting against the majority opinion in Krull. Id, 
The dissenting Justices argued that the rational in support of the 
holding in Leon, does not support the extension of the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule advocated by the majority 
opinion in Krull. Defendant urges the Court to adopt the arguments 
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of Justice O'Connor when considering l lit; lixjjJJ. extension of r lie 
exclusionary rule in 1 ight of whether such an extension is 
consistent with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Justice O'Connor recognizes l _ • - s: .: ne 
good faith exception "provide[s] a grace period for 
iinconst:itutional search and seizure legislation during which the 
State is permitted to violate constitutional i equirements with 
impunity." Krull, 480 U.S. at 361. Justice O'Connor continued: 
"Leon"H rationale does not support this extension of its rule, and 
the Court is unable to give any indepenuei: -rxson i i i defense of 
this departure from established precedent." Id. 
„" :t" AT iires authorizing unreasonable searches were the core 
concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendmei it." Id. -. *.; . The 
principle that legislature cannot authorize unreasonable searches 
has been embodi^-^ :> * the Fourth Amendment, and exclusion of 
evidence obtained as a result of unreasonable sear ches lias always 
been the remedy. £££ Ybarra v, Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres 
iLu. Puerto-Riga 442 u s. 4 65 (1979); Almeida Sanchez yT United 
States. 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 4U 
(1968); Beraer v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Weeks v. United 
States. 23 2 U.S, 383 (1914) . 
Moreover, Justice O'Connor draws a distinction between the 
holding in Leon where the majority found that there is no need to 
deter Hie judi^Liry, >uid the holding in Krull that allows 
legislature a grace period with impunity in passing 
unconstitutional statutes: 
Judicial authorization of a particular search does not 
threaten the liberty of everyone, but rather authorizes a 
single search under particular circumstances. The 
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legislative Act, on the other hand, sweeps broadly, 
authorizing whole classes of searches, without any 
particularized showing. A judicial officer's 
unreasonable authorization of a search affects one person 
at a time; a legislature's unreasonable authorization of 
searches may affect thousands or millions and will almost 
always affect more than one. Certainly the latter poses 
a greater threat to liberty. 
Krull, 480 U.S. at 365. 
Defendant's assertion is that whether it is one person or 
millions of people whose rights have been or will be violated, the 
exclusionary rule should apply. However, Justice O'Connor's 
observation of the far greater intrusion on citizen's Fourth 
Amendment rights as a result of legislative action should certainly 
be well taken. 
One of the reasons the Utah Supreme Court has diverged from 
federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is "for the purpose of 
establishing a more workable rule for police and trial courts than 
exists under confusing federal case law." State v. Jackson, 315 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (April 1997). The confusing decision in 
Krull is just such a decision that citizens from Utah should be 
protected from. Relative to the clarity and practicality of the 
extension of the good faith exception in Krull, Justice O'Connor 
states: 
the rule [the court] adopts is both difficult to 
administer and anomolous. The scope of the Court's good-
faith exception is unclear. Officers are to be held not 
to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute if 
its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should 
have known that the statute was unconstitutional. . . 
.(citations omitted) [I]t is not apparent how much 
constitutional law the reasonable officer is expected to 
know. 
Krull, 480 U.S. at 367. 
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F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e K.i u 13 c:i e c i s i o n w o i 13 <:i ::  i : • = a t e a :: h i 11 i i i g e f f e c t 
on the check and balances normally applied to legislation. If a 
criminal defendant has no hope of benefitting by paying the 
exiiorbant attorney "  s I ijes dnd uU IUL costs I:Jn. 11 •"1v,° "o^Pq^piry» to 
challenge a statute through the appeal process, ne likely will not 
do it " [T]he failure to apply the exclusionary rule in the very 
case inn which a stat>- atute is held I '« hav> violated \\he Fourth 
Amendment destroys all incentive on the part of individual criminal 
defendants to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights." IJL_ 9. 
Even if the Court finds that the Leon good faith exception is 
consistent with Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, the Court 
should f :i nc:i t: 1: i<=: t: t:I: Ie 1 Iz ull extension of t: 1 Ie 1 i eon except:i oi I is not 
consistent with Article I, § 14, and require evidence gathered in 
the present case to be suppressed. 
POIN Il" I 
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT POSED A 
RISK TO OFFICER SAFETY IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THE TERRY 
SEARCH. 
The trial c :>i n : t: 1: Eil d that the search of defendant' s person was 
justified due to exigent circumstances which supported a Terry type 
search. (R. 106-106.1); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "The 
filsk for dangerous weapons is a "carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons 
which might be used to assault [the officer].'" State v. Rochell. 
8:-0 - A -'" • 4 'n- ./*-• - ~99:) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 30). 
In order to justify a Terry frisk, an officer must demonstrate 
""specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.'" Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21). Additionally, when conducting a proper Terry frisk, the scope 
of the search must be limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing 
of the suspect in an effort to discover guns, knives, clubs, or 
other weapons that could be used to assault the police officer. 
Rochell 850 P.2d at 483. 
The Utah Legislature has codified the Terry frisk scenario in 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-16 (1990) : "A peace officer who has 
stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person 
for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other 
person is in danger." 
When considering the facts of the present case in light of 
Utah statutory and case law, it is evident that Deputy Shiverdecker 
did not have the right to conduct a Terry frisk in the first place, 
and even if he did properly instigate a Terry frisk, he exceeded 
the permissive scope of a Terry frisk by instructing Defendant to 
remove the items from her pocket instead of conducting a pat down 
search. (R. 239, at 251-252). 
A. The Facts Surrounding the Encounter Between Deputy 
Shiverdecker and Defendant do not Support a Reasonable 
Belief That the Officer or Any Other Person Was in 
Danger. 
In order for a police officer to conduct a proper Terry stop, 
he must comply with a two prong test: (1) the initial stop must be 
legally justified, and (2) subsequent actions must be within the 
scope of circumstances which justified the initial stop. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20. In the present case, Deputy Shiverdecker made 
contact with Defendant as a result of a roadblock stop. 
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Defendant's arguments that the initial stop was not justified 
pursuant to the first prong of the test are set forth above in this 
brief. 
Defendant had been a passenger in a vehicle that was being 
impounded for improper registration, and was waiting near the cite 
of the roadblock for a ride home. (R. 251). Deputy Shiverdecker 
testified that Defendant was agitated due to the circumstances, and 
therefore, he asked her if she had any weapons on her. (R. 251). 
Defendant replied that she did not have a knife. Deputy 
Shiverdecker then asked her if she had any sharp objects, and 
Defendant said no. (R. 251). Deputy Shiverdecker then asked her to 
remove the items in her pocket, and subsequently, methamphetamine 
was found in her pocket. (R. 253) . 
Notwithstanding Defendant's nervousness, and Deputy 
Shiverdecker's uncomfort with the manner in which Defendant 
answered his questions, there was no reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant posed a danger to justify a Terry search. In addition to 
Deputy Shiverdecker, there were eight to ten other deputies present 
(R. 254) , and the encounter with defendant was in the daylight 
where defendant could be easily observed while she waited for a 
ride. (R. 255) . 
11
 [T] he test for reasonable belief to frisk is objective." 
Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483. An objectively reasonable officer would 
not have feared that he or any other person was in danger at the 
time he conducted the Terry search of defendant. Therefore, the 
evidence found on Defendant's person should be suppressed. 
B. Deputy Shiverdecker Exceeded the Scope of a Proper Terry 
Frisk. 
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In as much as a Terry frisk is a narrow exception to the 
warrant requirement, its scope is confined to a pat-down of the 
outer clothing to determine if the suspect has any dangerous 
weapons which could impose a threat to the officer or another 
person. (U.C.A. § 77-7-16). In the present case, Deputy 
Shiverdecker did not even bother to conduct the pat down search and 
instead conducted a full blown search by requesting Defendant to 
empty her pockets. (R. 251) First, if Deputy Shiverdecker had 
truly been concerned that Defendant had a weapon, he certainly 
would not have given her the opportunity to gain access to that 
weapon by allowing her to remove the items from her pockets. 
Second, by making Defendant remove all the items she had, Deputy 
Shiverdecker searched everything that Defendant had on her person 
rather than only items which could be dangerous. 
The Utah Court of Appeals considered the issue of when an 
encounter between a defendant and police evolves into a level two 
stop and seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. The Court held 
"that defendant was seized for purposes of the fourth amendment at 
least at the point where [the officer] asked to conduct a pat-down 
search of defendant." State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah App. 
1991) (emphasis in original). Thus, in the present case, once the 
officer exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk by asking Defendant to 
remove the objects from her person instead of patting her down for 
possible weapons, the encounter between Deputy Shiverdecker and 
Defendant became a level two encounter. State v. Deitman, 73 9 P.2d 
616, 617 (Utah 1987). In order to justify a level two encounter, 
an officer must have an articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime. Id. At the time that 
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Deputy Shiverdecker instructed Defendant to remove objects from her 
person, he did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Defendant had committed a crime (other than the cited traffic 
offenses), and Deputy Shiverdecker's subsequent alleged discovery 
of contraband was the result of a search and seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Therefore, any and all items discovered on Defendant's person 
should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and 
remand the case to the Fourth District Court with directions to 
suppress the evidence and dismiss the charge. 
Respectfully submitted this Q day of August, 1997. 
Randall K. Spencer 
Attorney for Deherrera 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS Re: Roadblock 
CASE NO. 961400364 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING 
COMES NOW Defendant by and through her counsel of record, Michael E. Jewell, 
and submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion to 
suppress evidence illegally obtained by the State from Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about September 16, 1996 Defendant was stopped by Deputy Adams of the 
Utah County Sheriff's Office at a roadblock in American Fork Canyon. 
2. Proportedly, signs were posted informing Defendant of the roadblock and stating 
"No U-turn." 
3. Deputy Adams did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity to justify the stop of Defendant's vehicle. 
4. The roadblock was allegedly carried out pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-
101 - § 77-23-105 (1992). 
5. On or about June 15, 1992, Officer Craig Turner of the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office filed an application and affidavit in support of the application to conduct an 
administrative traffic check-point (roadblock) in American Fork Canyon (Tibbie Fork area). 
6. On or about June 15, 1992, the original order authorizing the roadblock was signed 
by Judge Lynn W. Davis. 
A. The original order designated the uniformed patrol sergeant as the command 
level deputy in charge of the check point 
B. The authorized time for the roadblock was June 15, 1992 — September 30, 
1992 from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. 
C. The application named a vast number of people (see exhibit E of original 
application contained in Provo Circuit Court File #921001173) who could 
participate in the roadblock. 
7. On or about August 31, 1992, Craig Turner of the Utah County Sheriffs Office 
submitted a request for amendment of the original order authorizing the roadblock(s). 
A. The amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from September 
1, 1992 through November 30, 1992 from 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. 
B. The amendment also requested the addition of eight names of persons who 
worked for the Department of Wildlife resource to the pool of people authorized to 
participate in the roadblocks. 
C. Judge Backlund signed the amendment on August 31, 1992. 
8. On or about December 2, 1992, Craig Turner submitted another amendment request 
of the original order authorizing the roadblock(s). 
A. This amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from 
December 1, 1992 through February 28, 1993 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 
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a.m. 
B. This amendment also requested the addition of seven Utah Highway Patrol 
officers added to the list of authorized personnel. 
C. Judge Sumsion signed the amendment on December 2, 1992. 
9. On or about [not dated presumeably in May, 1993] Craig Turner submitted another 
request to modify the original order authorizing the roadblock(s). 
A. This amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from June 1, 
1993 through August 31, 1993 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. 
B. This amendment also requested the addition of three people from the United 
States Forest Service who were named specifically in the request. 
C. Judge McGuire signed the amendment on or about May 26, 1993. 
10. On or about July 7, 1994, Alex Hunt of the Utah County Sheriffs Office submitted 
a request for amendment of the 1992 order authorizing the roadblock in question. 
A. This amendment requested the addition of five officers from the Utah Highway 
Patrol, one officer from the United States Forest Service, and one officer from the 
United States Park Service. Each officer was named in the amendment request. 
B. This amendment requested authorization to conduct a roadblock from August 
31, 1994 through August 31, 1995 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. 
C. Judge John Backlund signed the amendment on or about July 7, 1994. 
11. On or about May 26, 1995, Craig Turner submitted a request for amendment of the 
1992 order authorizing the roadblock in question. 
A. This amendment requested significant changes in the personnel who will be 
employed at the roadblock. Rather than the pool of deputies and officers which 
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were previously submitted, the amendment requested that all certified personnel 
from the following agencies be authorized to participate: 
1. Utah County Sheriff s Office 
2. Utah Highway Patrol 
3. Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
4. U.S. Forest Service 
5. Utah State Parks and Recreation 
B. This amendment requested authorization to conduct the roadblock from May 26, 
1995 through August 31, 1996 from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. 
C. It appears Judge Lynn W. Davis signed this amendment on May 26, 1995. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ROADBLOCK IN QUESTION WAS CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
The United States Supreme Court through Justice O'Connor has encouraged state 
courts to decide search and seizure issues on state constitutional basis. Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The tendency of the Utah appellate courts however, has been to look 
first to the U.S. Constitution and then to the State Constitution. In the present case, 
Defendant believes that the rational for suppressing evidence when considering the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution is significantly different, but under 
either rational, the result reached by the Court should be to suppress all evidence found as a 
result of the roadblock in this matter. 
KAY BRYSON #04 73 
Utah County Attorney 
MARIANE 0'BRYANT #5442 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY# STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, t PLAINTIPP'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
i MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
s AUTHORITIES 
vs. s 
LISA DEHERRERA, x Case No. 961400364 
Defendant(s). : Judge Ray M. Harding 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through Deputy County Attorney 
Mariane 0'Bryant, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities. 
FACTS 
On September 16, 1995, the defendant, Lisa Deherrera drove her 
vehicle towards a judicially approved administrative checkpoint 
located on State Road 144, near the Tibbie Fork Junction, in 
American Fork Canyon. The Defendant was contacted by an officer, 
at which time the officer discovered that the defendant did not 
have a valid driver's license and that her vehicle was not 
registered. The passenger was found to have an outstanding warrant 




was asked to transport the passenger to the jail on the warrant, 
and was informed that the vehicle was to be impounded. 
While assisting Deputy Adams in removing the occupants from 
the vehicle that was to be impounded, Deputy Shiverdecker asked the 
defendant to exit the vehicle. She appeared to be extremely 
agitated. The officer asked if she had any weapons on her person, 
to which she responded that she "didn't have a knife." She had a 
number of large objects visibly bulging from her pockets. Based on 
her agitation and the fact that she would be left unsupervised 
while awaiting a ride, the officer believed it appropriate to 
insure the safety of those in the area by conducting a Terry frisk. 
In order to facilitate the frisk, Deputy Shiverdecker asked 
the defendant to remove the objects from her pockets. She removed 
some items from her pockets, but the officer could see several 
objects remaining. When he asked what she had in her pocket, she 
did not answer, but pulled a round, plastic container from her 
pocket that contained baggies of methamphetamine. 
Officers also conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, at 
which time they discovered wooden marijuana pipe by the driver's 
door, and a quantity of marijuana under the passenger's seat. At 
the jail, the defendant informed the officer that all of the drugs 
in the vehicle were hers. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant moves to suppress all evidence obtained in this 




KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
Administrative Traffic 
Checkpoint No. 9 
APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 




Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County Sheriffs Office, State 
of Utah, hereby respectfully makes application for authorization to conduct an administrative 
traffic checkpoint based upon the following plan: 
1. Location: SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the 
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon. 
Geographical and Topographical Information: 
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade. 
On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle. 
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several 
vehicles. 
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See attached Exhibit "A" for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit WB" for 
the ASGS Topographical Map. 
2. Date: 15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992. 
Time: Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. 
3. Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped: 
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling 
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be 
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the 
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles. 
4. Purpose: 
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards; 
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements; 
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled 
substances; 
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required 
exterior safety devices; and 
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity. 
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are 
included in attached Exhibit "C." 
5. Personnel: 
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "E" attached shall 
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also 
listed on Exhibit "E" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command 
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be 
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical 
information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D." 
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6. Signs, Barriers, etc.: 
Exhibit "A" attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location, 
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the 
checkpoint. 
Photographs in Exhibit MFH attached, depict the site with signs in place. 
7. Advance Notice: 
The notice attached as Exhibit "GM will be, or has been, published in the Legal 
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days. 
Notice will be run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint. 
8. Instructions to Personnel: 
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this 
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies 
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit "G." Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and 
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation 
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command 
level deputy in charge. 
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every 
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature 
of, and the effect of the deviation. 
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed: 
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if 
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan. 
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle 
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe 
an offense is, or has been committed. 
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the 
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can 




4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area 
when the inquiry is complete. 
9. Summary of this Plan Minimizes the Following: 
a. Length of time the motorist is delayed, the maximum delay of five minutes, 
or if all personnel are busy, then traffic is allowed to pass freely through 
the checkpoint site. 
b. Intrusion of the inspection or inquiry is minimized in that further intrusion 
beyond that described in this plan must be based uppn articulable 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
c. Fear and anxiety are minimized in that advanced publication of the 
checkpoint appears in a local newspaper and advance signs are posted, 
reading -Sheriffs Checkpoint Ahead" and "Have Driver's License Ready." 
d. The degree of discretion is limited to adherence to the Sheriffs Department 
Checkpoint Policy. See attached Exhibit "G," instructions to participating 
deputies Exhibit "C," and this cite plan. 
e. Safety is maximized through the configuration and placement of warning 
signs, barricades, flashing lights, traffic cones, auxiliary lighting, i.e., 
vehicle headlights, take down lights or spot lights. Safety of deputies is 
maximized through the use of orange reflective vests and orange flashlight 
cones. 




The undersigned has reviewed the foregoing plan and finds it to appropriately: 
1. Minimize: 
a. The length of time motorists will be delayed; 
b. The intrusion of the inspection or inquiry; 
c. The fear and anxiety of the motorist; and 
d. The discretion left to the enforcement officers operating the checkpoint. 
2. Maximize the safety of motorists and enforcement officers. 
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoint. 
DATED this / b day of X ^ ^ ~ < , 1992. 
"7 
By the Court: 
S 
•ClfcjSt COURT JUDGE 
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Utah County Sheriff 
D A V I D R. B A T E M A N , S H E R I F F 
Lieutenant Craig W. Turner 
Patrol Commander 
Utah County Sheriff's Department 
P.O. Box 330 
Provo, Utah 84603 
AFFIDAVIT 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
CHECKPOINT AT SITE #9 
SR 144 TIBBLE FORK AREA 
Lieutenant Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's Department, 
herein after referred to as Affiant, being first duly sworn deposes 
and says that the following information with reference to the 
request before the Court for Administrative Traffic Checkpoints at 
Site #9, located on SR144 Tibbie Fork Area in American Fork Canyon 
in Utah County is true and correct. 
Affiant Craig W. Turner is the Patrol Commander with the Utah 
County Sheriff's Department, having served in this capacity since 
July 23, 1990. Affiant served as a Patrol Sergeant from February 
25, 1985, to July 23, 1990. Affiant has been employed by Utah 
County Sheriff's Department since July 1, 1981, and prior to this 
date, was a full-time employee with Ogden City Police Department, 
assigned to Patrol duties for 2 years and Detective duties for 5 
years. 
Affiant states that based on his experience and the experienced 
opinions of the Utah County Sheriff's Patrol Division Staff, this 
proposed checkpoint site is considered to be a problem area in Utah 
County with regards to violations of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Affiant has conducted traffic checkpoints in the past in American 
Fork Canyon locations other than Tibbie Fork and has determined 
that the Tibbie Fork area provides those features necessary in the 
canyon with regards to the safety issue and the goals of the 
checkpoint. The natural curves on either end of the proposed 
checkpoint area act as a speed inhibitor and make it difficult for 
drivers to exceed the posted speed limit of 30 mph, further 
enhancing the checkpoint supervisor's ability to control all 
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aspects of the checkpoint. This location also provides ample off-
road parking, and escape lanes in the event a vehicle is unable to 
stop or chooses to attempt to evade the checkpoint. 
Affiant has approved and monitored at least 20 Administrative 
Traffic Checkpoints sponsored by the Utah County Sheriff's 
Department at this site since 1984. The majority of these 
checkpoints have been conducted similarly to the proposed 
Checkpoint Plan that is before the Court now. The warning signs and 
the placement of these signs in prior checkpoints is very similar 
to the current proposed plan. 
Affiant has directed the operations of these checkpoints at this 
site in daylight and dark, during hot and cold weather, tffider clear 
conditions, during rainy conditions and snowing conditions while 
utilizing similar checkpoint design and signing devices. Affiant 
has never noticed or been made aware of any problems regarding 
safety or visibility to participating law enforcement personnel or 
the general public during any of the prior checkpoints at this 
site. Affiant further states that no traffic accidents nor near 
accidents have ever happened at this site during a checkpoint or 
as a result of a checkpoint at this site. 
Affiant has never conducted a checkpoint at this site during 
conditions where ice or snow has accumulated on the roadway nor 
does Affiant plan to conduct any checkpoints at this site when a 
condition of this type would significantly reduce the ability of a 
vehicle to come to a controlled stop. 
Affiant further states that the checkpoint will be conducted under 
strict compliance with the current Checkpoint Policy of the Utah 
County Sheriff's Department in every detail. A copy of the current 
policy is included with the proposal before the Court. Compliance 
with this policy includes, but is not limited to, the use of proper 
lighting during the hours of dusk and dark. The minimum lighting 
that will be used at this checkpoint site during the hours of 
darkness will include, but not be limited to the following: 
-Five flashing orange barricade lights. 
-One flood light provided by a patrol vehicle overhead system. 
-One set of flashing hazard lights mounted on a marked patrol 
vehicle which will be visible to all traffic approaching the 
site. 
-Two handheld illuminated orange flashlight wands. 
-Reflectorized orange vests worn by all participants. 
-Reflectorization on all signs utilized as per the site plan. 
-Ten reflectorized traffic cones. 
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to create or have 
created a brief video tape of each checkpoint that is conducted at 
this site. If the checkpoint is conducted during daylight hours 
and extends into dark, the supervisor will create a brief video of 
2 
-J - w1 
the checkpoint during daylight and dark hours. This video 
documentation will be maintained on a permanent basis by the 
Affiant, 
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to furnish the 
original written briefing plan and the debriefing plan to the 
Affiant for inclusion in a permanent site record which will be 
maintained by the Affiant, 
Affiant further states that the checkpoint plan as submitted to the 
Court has been examined in detail by the Utah County Sheriff's 
Department Traffic Accident Specialist, who is certified as an 
accident and traffic specialist by Northwestern University and is 
currently recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by 
various courts within Utah County. The specialist has informed me 
that he has examined this site in regards to all road conditions 
both natural and man made, speed limits, visibility, stopping 
distances and all other factors which may have an effect on the 
safety of this proposed plan. The specialist has informed me that 
this plan as proposed is, in his opinion, safe. The specialist has 
also assured Affiant that, in the proposed plan, he has factored in 
an acceptable margin of error in the event of excessive speed of 
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area. 
WHEREFORE, Affiant swears and deposes that the information 
contained herein is true and correct to the best of Affiant%s 
knowledge and belief. 
fax £/. , 
fAffiarft 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /^"gay of ^\jAsy^g 




KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF: : 
ORDER AUTHORIZING 
: ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
Administrative Traffic CHECKPOINT 
Checkpoint No. 9 : 
: File No. &Z /-//7$ /MS 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Lynn Davis presiding, on the State's 
Application for Administrative Checkpoint filed on or about June 15, 1992. The Court, having 
considered the application and made and entered its findings of fact and being fully advised in 
the premises, does hereby issue the following authorization to Craig Turner, a command level 
officer in the Utah County Sheriffs Office, to operate an administrative traffic checkpoint to be 
supervised by any of the following command level sergeants of the Utah County Sheriffs Office: 
Kerry Evans, Jens Horn, Alex Hunt, Mike McConnell or Jim Tracy. 
1. Location: SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the 
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon. 
Geographical and Topographical Information: 
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade. 
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On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle. 
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several 
vehicles. 
See attached Exhibit "A" for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit "B" for the 
ASGS Topographical Map. (All Exhibits in this order refer to exhibits attached 
to the application and are hereby incorporated by reference and shall also be 
attached to this order.) 
2. Date: 15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992. 
Time: Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. 
3. Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped: 
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling 
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be 
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the 
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles. 
4. Purpose: 
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards; 
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements; 
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled 
substances; 
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required 
exterior safety devices; and 
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity. 
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are 
included in attached Exhibit "C." 
5. Personnel: 
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "E" attached shall 
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also 
listed on Exhibit "E" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command 
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be 
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical 
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information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D." 
Participating deputies may be any of the Sheriffs officers identified in Exhibit 
"EM provided that any officer participating is fully briefed and operates in 
accordance with this order. 
6. Signs, Barriers, etc: 
Exhibit "A" attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location, 
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the 
checkpoint. 
Photographs in Exhibit "F" attached, depict the site with sign§ in place. 
7. Advance Notice: 
The notice attached as Exhibit "G" will be, or has been, published in the Legal 
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days. 
Notice will run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint. 
8. Instructions to Personnel: 
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this 
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies 
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit "G." Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and 
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation 
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command 
level deputy in charge. 
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every 
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature 
of, and the effect of the deviation. 
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed: 
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if 
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan. 
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle 
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe 
an offense is, or has been committed. 
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the 
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can 
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be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the 
checkpoint. 
4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area 
when the inquiry is complete. 
9. A copy of this order shall be retained in the Court's file. The original shall be 
issued to Lt. Craig Turner, the command officer who executed the application for 
this order. 
10. A copy of the roadblock plan and this signed authorization together with all 
attachments shall be issued to the patrol sergeant participating and^n command of 
the operation of the checkpoint. 
11. All enforcement officers participating in the operation of the checkpoint shall 
conform their activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in the 
plan. 
12. The checkpoint command level officer (patrol sergeant in charge) shall be available 
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been 
stopped at the checkpoint upon request of the motorist. 
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative Traffic 
Checkpoint. 
DATED this /5~ day of _ _ j ^ ^ ^ f Z , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• f t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF: FINDINGS 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
CHECKPOINT NO. 9 CASE NO. 
(SR 144 Tibbie Fork Canyon) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On June 15, 1992, the Utah County Attorney's office, together 
with Lt. Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's office, 
submitted a written application and authorization for an 
administrative traffic checkpoint. The only issue before the court 
is whether the authorization which is sought is allowed by virtue 
of compliance with House Bill 259. The constitutionality of 
administrative checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution 
is not at issue. The application is supported with over 20 pages 
of exhibits, 8 relevant photographs, and a copy of House Bill No. 
2 59, the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act. Supplemental 
information regarding the safety of the motorists and the 
enforcement officers was required by Judge Lynn W. Davis. Lt. 
Craig W. Turner, Patrol Commander of the Utah County Sheriff's 
submitted a supporting affidavit dated June 12, 1992. This court 
has carefully reviewed the application and the exhibits to 
determine compliance with the Act. Of major concern of this court, 
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is the protection of citizenry; the health, safety and welfare of 
the travelling and pedestrian and law enforcement public are vital. 
This court makes the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. House Bill 259 (Administrative traffic Checkpoint Act) was 
passed in the 1992 session of the Utah State Legislature. 
2. House Bill 259 went into effect on Monday, April 27, 1992. 
3. The application seeks authority to stop vehicles under 77-
23-103(5) which purports to allow vehicle stops and occupant 
detention when the enforcement officer "is acting pursuant to a 
duly authorized administrative traffic checkpoint authority granted 
by a magistrate in accordance with § 77-23-104." 
4. For the purposes herein, Judge Lynn W. Davis, a Fourth 
Circuit Court Judge, is acting as a magistrate. 
5. Officer Craig Turner, Deputy Utah County Sheriff, is a 
command level officer and has submitted a written plan in 
conformity with 77-23-104(2)(a)(i). 
6. The location of the checkpoint, geographically and 
topographically, is adequately described in paragraph 1 of the 
application. An ASGS topographical map is attached to the 
application as Exhibit "B" and the photographs in Exhibit "F" 
further visually describe the area. The application fully complies 
with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(i). 
7. The date, time and duration of the checkpoints are 
adequately described in paragraph No. 2 of the application and the 
applicant has complied fully with the requirements of 77-23-
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104 (2) (a)(ii). There is nothing in the Act which would appear to 
preclude the seeking of a multiple-day authority as recjuested by 
the applicant herein. Faithful compliance with the plan would, of 
course, be necessary on all authorized days. 
8. The sequence of the traffic to be stopped is adequately 
and reasonably identified in paragraph No. 3 in the application and 
the applicant has fully complied with the requirements of 77-23-
104(2)(a)(iii). 
9. The purpose of the checkpoint and the inspection or 
inquiry to be conducted are adequately and reasonably identified in 
paragraph No. 4, a, b, c, d, and e of the application. 
Furthermore, the court finds that Exhibit "C" attached to the 
application supplements the purposes and the inquiry set forth in 
the application. The court specifically finds that the applicant 
has complied with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv). 
10. The request of the applicant is for a continuing, large 
scale checkpoint for 75 days. By virtue of that uniqueness, the 
applicant has provided a pool of names of officers who will 
participate in the checkpoints. The pool is comprised of the names 
of officers who actually will participate, but the exact assignment 
has not yet been determined. Paragraph No. 5 of the application 
provides that a minimum of three uniformed deputies will be present 
at each checkpoint, with one being a uniformed patrol sergeant. 
The patrol sergeant shall be the command level deputy in charge of 
the checkpoint. The court further finds that the patrol sergeant 
shall maintain a roster of participating deputies. 
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While 77-23-104(2)(a)(v) appears to require exactitude in the 
naming of personnel, it certainly does not appear that a pool of 
names as provided herein would be necessarily precluded. 
This court finds that the information contained within 
paragraph No. 5 of the application, together with the information 
contained in Exhibit "E" sufficiently complies with the 
requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a) (v) . (This court, as an aside, has 
also made this finding of compliance based upon the best interests 
of justice, judicial economy, 1 court case as opposed to 75 cases 
opened reducing clerk staff time etc., and based upon the realities 
of law enforcement and daily life; law enforcement officers may be 
called at any time, even while conducting a checkpoint, to 
emergencies and/or a specifically identified officer may become 
sick, etc. Would a substitution of an equally trained, qualified 
and competent officer defeat the checkpoint, absent magisterial 
sanction for the substitution? The critical concern of this court 
is that trained, uniformed officers, conduct the checkpoint 
according to the magisterial authorized plan and that a patrol 
sergeant be present who is in charge. The pooled concept appears 
both to meet the intent of the law and the health, safety and 
welfare concerns of this court in protecting the travelling and 
pedestrian and law enforcement citizenry of this community.) 
11. Exhibit "A" attached to the application and the 
photographs in Exhibit "F" depict the types and location/site, and 
spacing of signage which will be used. The application satisfies 
the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a) (vi) . 
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12. A reference is made to advance notice in paragraph 7 of 
the application. Legal notice, though very generic, has been or 
will be published in the Legal Notice section of the Provo Daily 
Herald, running for three consecutive days. Notice is or has been 
run within 30 days prior to the establishment of the requested 
checkpoint. The application is supported by Exhibit "G", which 
contains a copy of the Legal Notice published on Wednesday, April 
15, 1992 in Section D page 3 of the Provo Daily Herald. Proof of 
publication has also been presented. The court takes judicial 
notice that the Provo Daily Herald is a newspaper of wide and 
general circulation in Utah County. Accordingly, this court finds 
the application meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(vii). 
13. Exhibit "C" attached to the application details the 
instructions that will be read by each Officer involved in the 
operation of the checkpoint and satisfies the requirement of 77-23-
104(2)(a)(viii). 
14. The court finds that the plan minimizes the length of 
time the motorist will be delayed (77-23-104(2)(b)(i)) because of 
the following: 
a) Routine inspection and inquiry is expected to be 
less than one minute in duration; (see Utah 
County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing Instruction, 
paragraph 6, attached as Exhibit "C"). 
b) In the event stopped traffic waiting to be 
inspected exceeds a 5 minute wait, all traffic 
shall be waived through checkpoint until there 
5 
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are available personnel to check arriving 
vehicles. (Application paragraph 3). 
c) Safety precautions have been faithfully 
addressed. 
15. The Court further finds that the intrusion upon the 
travelling public is minimal and that the plan anticipates that 
routine inspection and inquiry is expected to take less than one 
minute in duration. (Utah County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing 
Instructions). 77-23-104(2)(b)(ii) . Deviation from the plan is 
not permitted except as authorized under specific circumstances. 
16. The court finds under 77-23-104(2)(b)(iii), that the plan 
takes measures to attempt to minimize the fear and anxiety the 
motorist will experience by virtue of: 
a) signage; 
b) notice; 
c) the location of the checkpoint is a straight-of-way; 
d) safety issues have been faithfully addressed; 
e) pull off areas for the travelling public are provided; 
17. The court further finds that the degree of discretion to 
be exercised by individual enforcement officers operating the 
checkpoint is minimized (77-23-104(2)(b)(iv)) by virtue of the 
following: 
a) the exact location is established; 
b) the signage is established by the plan; 
c) the length of time the motorist will be delayed is 
established by the plan; 
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d) sequence of traffic issues are addressed by the plan; 
e) inquiry is limited under the plan; 
f) any necessary further inspections will be conducted out of 
traffic lanes; 
g) most importantly, any deviation from the checkpoint plan 
or policy shall require specific permission from the 
checkpoint supervisor who shall document the reasons for, 
nature of and effect of any deviation (Utah County Sheriff 
Checkpoint Briefing Instructions, page 2, 2(d)), 
18. The application satisfies the requirements of 77-23-
104(2)(a)(v). The utilization of signage, notice, flashing lights 
take into account safety measures to protect the travelling and 
pedestrian traffic. The location chosen has pull off areas and is 
a straight-of-way. This finding is based upon the plan of the 
exhibits submitted and the affidavit of Officer Craig Turner. 
Specifically, the court relies upon the affidavit which supports 
the facts that the court finds that: 
a) the choice of location is based upon safety 
considerations; 
b) SR 144, approx 1 mi. from the junction with SR92 in 
American Fork Canyon provides the best conditions 
available with regards to safety issues and the goals and 
purposes of the checkpoint; 
c) Lt. Turner has participated in or supervised at least 20 
checkpoints at this location since 1984; 
d) it is a location where the patrol sergeant (supervisor) 
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can control all aspects of the checkpoint; 
e) the location provides escape lanes in the event a vehicle 
is unable to stop or chooses to attempt to evade the 
checkpoint; 
f) the warning signage and placement is similar to that 
utilized in the past and safety problems to the travelling 
public and the participating officers have not been 
problematical; 
g) no traffic accidents nor near accidents have ever happened 
at this site during a checkpoint or as a result of a 
checkpoint at this site; 
h) adequate lighting will be utilized to alert the travelling 
public when conducted at night; 
i) the plan has been submitted to, and examined in detail by, 
the Utah County Sheriff's Department Traffic Accident 
Specialist, who is certified as an accident and traffic 
specialist by Northwestern University and who is currently 
recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by 
courts in Utah County; 
j) said specialist has examined the plan with respect to all 
road conditions, both natural and man made, speed limits, 
visibility, stopping distances and all other factors which 
may have an effect on the safety of the proposed plan; 
k) in addition, the specialist has factored in an acceptable 
margin of error in the event of excessive speed of 
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area; 
8 
k) after thorough examination and review, the Departments 
Traffic Accident Specialist has opined that the plan, as 
submitted, is safe. 
18. By virtue of the above findings, this court specifically 
finds that the plan meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(b) as 
required by 77-23-104(3) and the balance of the requirements of the 
Act and that authorization to conduct the checkpoint in accordance 
with the plan may issue. 
DATED this /3~ day of June, 1992. 
L¥tfN W. DAVIS 
Fourth Circuit Court Judge 
Acting as Magistrate 
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Craig R. Madsen 
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
AMENDMENT TO 
Administrative Traffic APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZA-
TION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ,,iX's 
Checkpoint Nos.l through 9 TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT ^ Z / ^ ' ' / J > / 
FILE NO. 
AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION °j Z f — 1° Z 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for 
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following 
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established 
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel 
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and 
upon changes sought in the original authorizations. 
•000 057 
The administrative checkpoints executed to date have resulted in over 4,000 
vehicles passing through the checkpoints with no accidents or problems occuring at any 
checkpoint Approximately 15 complaints have been received from citizens at checkpoints 
out of the approximately 4,504 vehicles involved. 
PERSONNEL CHANGES 
1. In each existing application and authorization it is requested that the following 
names be added as authorized participants: 
Qfficcr/Trogpg, Qreaniation/AgCTcy 
Delbert Atkinson Department of Wildlife Resources 
Lynn Briggs Department of Wildlife Resources 
Howard Jaquart Department of Wildlife Resources 
Jody Becker Department of Wildlife Resources 
Kevin Cherry Department of Wildlife Resources 
Cliff Helms Department of Wildlife Resources 
Karen Green Department of Wildlife Resources 
Vic Layton Department of Wildlife Resources 
(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the State department 
named) 
SITE AMENDMENTS 
CHECKPOINT SITE #1 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #2 
..000 056 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
i t**** :00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #3 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
q OH*. 
times of operation be amended to include between 4:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #4 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between t:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #5 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between f :00 p.m. and 2:30 am 
CHECKPOINT SITE #6 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
r :00 p.m. and 2:30 am 
CHECKPOINT SITE #7 
.,000 055 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between t:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #8 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 1:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #9 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 September 1992 through 30 November 1992, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 1:00 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
DATED this J/ day of August, 1992 
1/llHv %./' JA 
'"^t^* UGa#Tumer 
Utah County Sheriffs Office 
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION 
THIS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application 
and the court having examined the original applications for each site requested together with 
the requested amendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each 
of the requested amendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The requested amendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the 
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court 
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered 
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations. 
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court 
DATED this }l day of A ^ g ^ ^ 1 ^ . 1992. ^ - r ? 7 * ^ 
BY THE COURT // c ^ , 3 0 c ' *•»- f/s. 




Craig R. Madsen 
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
AMENDMENT TO 
Administrative Traffic APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZA-
TION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
Checkpoint Nos. 1 through 9 TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT 
I FILE NO. 
AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for 
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following 
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established 
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel 
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and 
upon changes sought in the original authorizations. 
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The administrative checkpoints executed to date have resulted in over 6,000 
vehicles passing through the checkpoints with no accidents or problems occuring at any 
checkpoint Approximately 20 complaints have been received from citizens at checkpoints 
out of the approximately 6,500 vehicles involved. 
PERSONNEL CHANGES 
1. In each existing application and authorization it is requested that the following 
names be added as authorized participants: 
Qfficg/Trogpcr Qw<\n\7a\m/h^m 
Rick Mayo Utah Highway Patrol 
Erik Brinkman Utah Highway Patrol 
Margaret Haidie Utah Highway Patrol 
Thayes Brailsfond Utah Highway Patrol 
Hobie Metz Utah Highway Patrol 
Marie Millett Utah Highway Patrol 
Sam Naylor Utah Highway Patrol 
(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the State department 
named) 
SITE AMENDMENTS 
CHECKPOINT SITE #1 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between ^ # 0 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #2 
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1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between tmd p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #3 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 Febniaiy 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between A60 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #4 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include lfcDecember 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 4SB0 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #5 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 9B0 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #6 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
u : ho 
times of operation be amended to include between £80 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #7 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between *ii©Q p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #8 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 66Q p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #9 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 December 1992 through 28 February 1993, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between (590 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
DATED this X > ^ d a y of December, 1992 
UQ^fe Turner 
Utah County Sheriffs Office 
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION 
IMS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application 
and the court having examined the original applications for each site requested together with 
the requested amendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each 
of the requested amendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The requested amendments arc hereby authorized and incoiporated into the 
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court 
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered 
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations, 
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court 
DATED this 3» day of December, 1992. 
BYTHE COURT 
Judge of tBe Fourth Ofcuit Court 
•OuO 058 
Craig R. Madsen 
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo.Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
AMENDMENT TO 
Administrative Traffic APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZA-
TION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
Checkpoint Nos. 1 through 9 TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT 
FileNo.s 921000851,921000903 
921000852, 921000902, 921000901 
921000900, 921000899, 921000898 
MS _ 
/ 
AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for 
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following 
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established 
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel 
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and 
upon changes sought in the original authorizations. 
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The administrative checkpoints executed to date have resulted in over 11,000 
vehicles passing through the checkpoints with no accidents or problems ocuning at any 
checkpoint Approximately 50 complaints have been received from citizens at checkpoints 
out of the approximately 11,000 vehicles involved. 
PERSONNEL CHANGES 
1. In each existing application and authorization it is requested that the following 
names be added as authorized participants: 
Offigq/TtTOpgr Organization/Agencv 
Kent Comaby US Forest Savice Law Enforcement 
Dave Griffel US Forest Service Law Enforcement 
Tim Clark US Forest Service Law Enforcement 
(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the department named) 
SITE AMENDMENTS 
CHECKPOINT SITE #1 
( Court File # 921000851 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #2 
(Court File # 921000903 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #3 
(Court File # 921000852 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #4 
(Court File # 921000902 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #5 
(Court File # 921000901 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #6 
(Court File # 921000900 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 am. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #7 
(Court File # 921000899 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #8 
(Court File # 921000898 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #9 
(Court File # MS 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 1 June 1993 through 31 August 1993, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
DATED this day of May, 1993 
LtQaig Turner 
Utah County Sh&tff s Office 
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION 
THIS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application 
and the court having examined the original applications for each site requested together with 
the requested amendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each 
of the requested amendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The requested amendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the 
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court 
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered 
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations. 
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court 
DATED this £ ^ day of May, 1993. 
BYTHE COURT 
PROVO C»TV court! 
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Craig R. Madsen 
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo.Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
AMENDMENT TO 
Administrative Traffic APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
Checkpoint Nos.l through 9 TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT 
FileNo.s 921000851,921000903 
921000852, 921000902, 921000901 
921000900, 921000899, 921000898 
9210001173 MS 
/ 
AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for 
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following 
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established 
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel 
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and 
upon changes sought in the original authorizations. 
..000 073 
PERSONNEL CHANGES 
1. In each existing application and authorization it is requested that the following 









Utah Highway Patrol 
Utah Highway Patrol 
Utah Highway Patrol 
Utah Highway Patrol 
Utah Highway Patrol 
U.S. Forest Service 
U.S. Park Service/Timpanogos N.M. 
(all of the above are certified law enforcement officers with the depanment named) 
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SITE AMENDMENTS 
CHECKPOINT SITE #1 
( Court File # 921000851 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #2 
(Court File # 921000903 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #3 
(Court File # 921000852 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #4 
(Court File # 921000902 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
•000 071 
CHECKPOINT SITE #5 
(Court File # 921000901 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #6 
(Court File # 921000900 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #7 
(Court File # 921000899 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #8 
(Court File # 921000898 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
-000 070 
CHECKPOINT SITE #9 
(Court File # 9210001173 MS 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 31 August 1994 through 31 August 1995, and that the authorized 
times of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
DATED t h i s _ 2 ^ d a y of £weVl994 
LL Alex Hunt 
Utah County Sheriffs Office 
.000 069 
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION 
THIS MATTER having come before the court through this Amended Application 
and the court having examined the original applications for each site requested together with 
the requested amendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each 
of the requested amendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The requested amendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the 
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court. 
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered 
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations. 
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court. 
DATED this ' day of Jtmc, 1994. 
BY THE COURT 




Craig R. Madsen 
Deputy Utah County Attorney #2045 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo.Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
AMENDMENT TO 
Administrative Traffic APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
Checkpoint Nos. 1 through 9 TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT 
File No.s 921000851,921000903 
921000852, 921000902, 921000901 
921000900, 921000899, 921000898 
9210001173 MS 
I 
AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make amended application for 
authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following 
changes to the existing plan approved by this court for each of the now established 
administrative checkpoint locations. Amendments are based upon changes in personnel 
needs and applications, upon corrected descriptions in from the original applications and 
upon changes sought in the original authorizations. 
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PERSONNEL CHANGES 
1. In each existing application and authorization it is requested that the following 
changes be added as authorized participants: 
All sworn and/or certified law enforcement ofificcrs for the following State and 
Federal agencies: 
a. Utah County Sheriff s Office 
b. Utah Highway Patrol 
c. Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
d. U.S. Forest Service 
f. Utah State Paries and Recreation 
2. That the command level / supervisor for each checkpoint shall be any Sergeant, 
Lieutenant or Captain of the Utah County Sheriff s Office. 
SITE AMENDMENTS 
CHECKPOINT SITE #1 
( Court File # 921000851 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #2 
(Court File # 921000903 MS) 
1. ft is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #3 
(Court File # 921000852 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times of 
operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #4 
(Court File # 921000902 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
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CHECKPOINT SITE #5 
(Court File # 921000901 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized tjmes 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.nx and 2:30 a.m. 
CHECKPOINT SITE #6 
(Court File # 921000900 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.nx 
CHECKPOINT SITE #7 
(Court File # 921000899 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.nx and 2:30 a m 
CHECKPOINT SITE #8 
(Court File # 921000898 MS) 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.nx and 2:30 a m 
..009 076 
CHECKPOINT SITE #9 
(Court File # 9210001173 MS 
1. It is requested that the application and authorization for dates of operation be 
amended to include 26 May 1995 through 31 August 1996, and that the authorized times 
of operation be amended to include between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. 
DATED this day of May, 1995 
Li Chug Turner *—-^ 
Utah County Sheriffs Office 
..JvC 075 
AMENDED AUTHORIZATION 
THIS MATTER having come before die coun through this Amended Application 
and the court having examined the original applications for each site requested together with 
the requested amendments to each sight, and good and sufficient cause appearing for each 
of the requested amendments it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The requested amendments are hereby authorized and incorporated into the 
original authorizations heretofore issued by this court 
2. A copy of this Amended Application and Amended Authorization is Ordered 
placed in each of the files together with the original applications and authorizations. 
3. The Amended Authorizations shall become effective upon signing by the court 
DATED this ^ > day of May, 1996. 
BYTHE COURT 
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CASE NO. 961400364 
DATE: September 11, 1996 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda both in support of and 
in opposition to the Motion, the Court delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Opinion of the Couit 
The Court finds that the Defendant's arguments in support of her Motion to Reconsider 
are fact sensitive issues that have been sufficiently addressed in the Court's prior ruling. In 
addition, the Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider based on the State's failure to 
proffer evidence in support of the Good Faith Exception. The Court finds that there is no 
requirement for the State to prove good faith when the officers were acting pursuant to what 
they believed was a valid warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 
Order 
The Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration is denied. 
Dated this llth day of September, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Public Defender, Esq. 
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CASE NO. 961400364 
DATE: July 5T 1996 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Defendants Motion to 
Suppress. Having received and considered the Motion, and having heard and considered the 
evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion. 
Factual Background 
On September 16, 1995 the Defendant approached an administrative checkpoint near 
the Tibbie Fork Junction in American Fork Canyon. The Utah County Sheriffs Office had 
set up a roadblock which had been judicially approved. The Defendant was driving as she 
and her passengers neared the roadblock. Upon reaching the roadblock the Defendant was 
questioned by an officer who discovered that the Defendant was driving an unregistered 
vehicle and that she did not have a valid driver's license. 
Furthermore, it was discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for one of the 
passengers who was placed under arrest. After speaking with the other passengers, and 
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finding that there was no one who could legally drive the vehicle, the officers were forced to 
impound the vehicle. 
Deputy Shiverdecker asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle at which time he noticed 
her agitated character. Realizing that she, with the other passengers, would be waiting at the 
roadblock unattended until their ride came, Deputy Shiverdecker asked if the Defendant had 
any weapons. The Defendant stated that she "did not have a knife." The Deputy, suspicious 
of her answer, attempted to neutralize the situation to assure the safety of those at the 
roadblock by conducting a Terry search of the Defendant 
The Deputy conducted the Terry frisk by first patting down the Defendant's left pants 
pocket which he felt contained change and other insignificant items. While patting down the 
right pants pocket of the Defendant, Deputy Shiverdecker found it extremely full and bulging 
such that he was unable to discern what the pocket contained. To facilitate the search the 
Deputy asked the Defendant to empty her pocket which she did, however not completely. 
The Deputy noted that there was still a bulge in her pocket and asked the Defendant what it 
was. The Defendant then proceeded voluntarily to extract a small container which through its 
transparent walls it appeared to contain methamphetamine. 
Opinion of the Court 
L Fourth Amendment Principles 
A. Regarding the Roadblock 
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock. 
Michigan State Police v. Sitzy 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). However, this "seizure" is 
10b 
reasonable in light of the Fourth Amendment upon applying a balancing analysis. Sitz, 496 
U.S. at 455. This balancing analysis includes 3 criterion; 1) the state's interest in preventing 
accidents caused by drunk drivers, 2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving 
that goal, and 3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints. 
Id. at 449. When these criterion are met the roadblocks are allowed in order to check for 
drunk drivers. 
The applicable procedure for these "administrative traffic checkpoints" is set forth in 
sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 of the Utah Code. The purpose of the roadblock, its 
date, time and duration, the names of the personnel working the checkpoint, and the 
instructions to be given to the officers at the checkpoint all need to be provided in the plan 
which must be signed by a magistrate in order to effectuate the checkpoint. Utah Code § 77-
23-104 (1992). It is the responsibility of the Magistrate to ensure that the plan as proposed 
and presented by the law enforcement officers does not violate any of the above 3 criterion in 
Sitz and the limits set forth by the statute. 
The officers who obtain the plan from the Magistrate invoke what the Supreme Court 
termed a "good faith" rule which precludes the exclusion of evidence seized by an officer 
when acting in good faith upon a warrant. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
B. Regarding the Search of the Defendant's Person 
Warrantless searches are constitutionally permissible only where probable cause and 
exigent circumstances exist. State v. Larvcco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Such exigent 
circumstances exist when a police officer feels that he or someone else may be in danger. 
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This is measured by the "reasonably prudent man under the circumstances" standard. State v. 
Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988), quoting State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1986). 
LL Analysis 
A. Regarding the Roadblock 
Applying these Fourth Amendment principles to the present case, the Court finds that 
with regards to the roadblock, the plan for the administrative checkpoint did not comply with 
the terms of the statute because it was overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional. 
However, this situation is similar to that of obtaining a search warrant. There is a 
presumption, as stated above, that when an officer relies upon a warrant that has been 
reviewed and issued by a neutral judge he is acting in good faith which precludes the 
evidence from being excluded. Similarly, in the instant case, where the plan for the 
roadblock was submitted to and approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to rely 
upon such approval in good faith and therefore the evidence should not be suppressed because 
of the good faith exception. 
The statute describes various specifics with which the administrative checkpoint must 
comply before it is to be approved by the judiciary. The time, date, duration, the names of 
the personnel to be employed at the checkpoint, and the instructions and purpose of the 
checkpoint must be included. 
Although in the instant case the time, date and duration are included in the plan the 
Court finds that an ongoing checkpoint which may be set up at any time over a period of a 
year is entirely too long and does not meet the intent of the statute. 
Also, the names of the personnel are required to be on the plan, in this case merely the 
office from which they were to come was placed on the plan. Thus, the specificity that the 
statute requires was not included in the plan. 
Lastly, the purpose as well as the instructions which the officers have at the roadblock 
went beyond the scope of the statute. The roadblocks are ideally set up to check for drunk 
drivers. By broadening the search the officers violate the third criterion of the Sitz test and 
the search conducted at the roadblock becomes too intrusive upon an individual's rights. 
B. Regarding the Search of Defendant's Person 
Applying the above Fourth Amendment principles the Court finds that there were 
sufficient exigent circumstances to authorize Deputy Shiverdecker's search of the Defendant's 
person. 
The Deputy was justified in performing the search of the Defendant because of the 
circumstances that required the Deputy to leave the Defendant unattended at the checkpoint as 
well as the agitated character of the Defendant, the suspicious answer regarding a "knife," and 
the bulging pocket. 
The Deputy conducted the Terry search in an effort to reduce the possibility of harm 
to himself or to his fellow officers. The following request to have the Defendant empty the 
contents of her pocket was reasonable because the Deputy was unable to identify the objects 
by merely feeling through the pockets. Furthermore, questioning her about what still 
remained in her pocket was still within the bounds of the search and her voluntary production 
of the item in no way provides reason which would allow the Court to suppress the evidence. 
The search of Defendant's person was allowed because of the exigent circumstances 
and the evidence will not be suppressed. 
Order 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
order within 15 days of this decision consistent with and in support of the terms of this 
memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission 
to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is 
signed by the Court. 
Dated this-jfi&day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Mariane O'Bryant, Esq. 
Michael E. Jewell, Esq. 
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